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Abstract 
This study engages with the Republic of Kiribati placed in the Pacific Ocean, which is said 
to disappear due to rising sea levels and climate change within 30 years. The starting point 
of the study contemplates the terminology of a person displaced as diffuse. Thus, we ask how 
climate migration is discursively constructed by the three actors Anote Tong, Pelenise Alofa 
and John Key, and further how this relates to power relations, and the way meaning is 
ascribed to climate change, responsibility and national identity.  
To examine this, a discursive multiperspectival approach is chosen, including non-discursive 
theoretical perspectives on the topic, in which the discourses will be analyzed and discussed. 
The empirical data to be examined in this study exemplifies different power positions and 
aligning articulations. Through the themes it is highlighted how the chosen actors ascribe 
meaning to the notion of climate migration. Approaching climate change from a field of 
study in humanities, are enables to account for cultural, social and political consequences of 
the discourses on climate migration. 
The study concludes that there is an antagonistic battle between the discourses, which 
ascribe meaning to climate change either as a present or a future issue, which contemplates 
how climate change is a fluid concept. It is suggested that climate change is a human rights 
issue, at the same time as it problematizes how the existing categories and legal frameworks 
are insufficient. Identity is constructed through the signifiers of cultural rootedness and 
Christian belief, which ascribe meaning to the I-Kiribatian national identity. Migration as a 
solution is problematized, as it entails a loss of identity and therefore when planning 
migration as an adaptation strategy it is important to account for the many appertaining 
complexities. 
The international community is constructed as a failed myth and the responsibility towards 
Kiribati’s challenges due to climate change is placed upon industries and nation-state 
leaders.  It is argued that more than a legal framework is needed to encounter the urgency of 
Kiribati’s disappearance, thus the idea of Nation-Ex Situ is applied. Furthermore, it is 
suggested that we should look beyond borders and that nation-states should look beyond 
national interests to pursue a more meaningful and rational global system, as the division of 
nation-states and borders fixates the lack of action towards climate migration and enforces 
the unequal power relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table of Contents 
Introduction	  ...................................................................................................................................	  1	  
Problem	  Field	  .................................................................................................................................	  2	  
Problem	  statement	  ...................................................................................................................	  4	  
Contextual	  Framework	  ...............................................................................................................	  5	  
Climate	  change	  and	  rising	  sea	  levels	  ..................................................................................	  5	  
Why	  Kiribati?	  .............................................................................................................................	  6	  
The	  Colonial	  history	  of	  migration	  in	  the	  Pacific	  .............................................................	  7	  
Methodology	  ...................................................................................................................................	  8	  
Social	  practice	  ............................................................................................................................	  9	  
Language	  ....................................................................................................................................	  10	  
Group	  formation	  and	  identity	  ............................................................................................	  11	  
Order	  of	  discourses	  ................................................................................................................	  12	  
Visual	  display	  of	  multiperspectival	  approach	  ..............................................................	  12	  
Multiperspectival	  approach	  ................................................................................................	  14	  
Our	  tool	  ......................................................................................................................................	  15	  Dimension	  1:	  Text	  ................................................................................................................................	  15	  Dimension	  2:	  Discursive	  practice	  ..................................................................................................	  16	  Dimension	  3:	  Social	  practice	  ...........................................................................................................	  17	  
Thematic	  overview	  .................................................................................................................	  22	  
Introduction	  to	  the	  chosen	  cases	  ...........................................................................................	  22	  
TED	  talk	  with	  Anote	  Tong	  ....................................................................................................	  23	  
Radio	  interview	  with	  Pelenise	  Alofa	  ................................................................................	  24	  
Newscast	  interview	  with	  John	  Key	  ....................................................................................	  24	  
Analysis	  ..........................................................................................................................................	  25	  
Climate	  change	  is	  already	  here	  ..........................................................................................	  25	  
Climate	  change	  is	  a	  future	  issue	  ........................................................................................	  28	  
Climate	  change	  is	  a	  human	  rights	  issue	  ..........................................................................	  30	  
Kiribati	  -­‐	  in	  need	  of	  help?	  .....................................................................................................	  32	  
A	  Christian	  Community	  .........................................................................................................	  35	  
The	  I-­‐Kiribatian	  perception	  of	  migration	  .......................................................................	  37	  
The	  power	  of	  discursive	  legitimacy	  ..................................................................................	  40	  
Protecting	  your	  pacific	  neighbors?	  ...................................................................................	  42	  Calling	  out	  Australia	  ............................................................................................................................	  45	  
Earth	  democracy	  in	  a	  globalizing	  world	  .........................................................................	  46	  
Discussion	  and	  Assessment	  .....................................................................................................	  49	  
The	  fluid	  notion	  of	  climate	  change	  ...................................................................................	  49	  
Climate	  change:	  A	  human	  rights	  issue	  or	  an	  issue	  for	  the	  International	  Human	  
Rights	  Law?	  ...............................................................................................................................	  51	  
Adaptation	  Strategies	  ............................................................................................................	  53	  
The	  power	  of	  and	  the	  fallacies	  within	  structures	  and	  categories	  ..........................	  56	  
The	  exit	  of	  borders	  .................................................................................................................	  58	  
Contemporary	  crisis	  and	  climate	  migration	  .............................................................................	  60	  
Conclusion	  .....................................................................................................................................	  62	  
Bibliography	  .................................................................................................................................	  64	  
Web	  Resources	  ........................................................................................................................	  65	  
 
 1 
Introduction 
This study builds upon a profound interest in and questioning of a well-funded 
pronouncement of the disappearance of the Republic of Kiribati within the next 30 years. 
Kiribati is located in the Pacific Ocean and consists of three island groups: the Gilbert Group 
on the west, the Phoenix Islands in the middle, and the Line Islands to the east. The islands 
consist of coral atolls and are on average about two meters above sea level and rarely more 
than two kilometers in width. 
Human-induced climate change was the point of departure that forwarded the choice of 
Kiribati, thus we do not pursue to answer whether or not climate change is human-induced. 
Rather we seek to display and examine the consequential matters of existing unequal power 
relations in relation to climate migration. Climate change as an overall topic might seem 
diffuse to some when deriving from humanities, as climate change has been and still is 
approached from the field of natural science. Within the field of natural science, the aim has 
been to outline the numbers, figures and future predictions and impacts of climate change 
(Sørensen & Eskjær, 2014: 11). In recent time, the scholarly contributions within 
environmental issues have expanded to the field of humanities. This enables the perspectives 
of how humans are affected by the climate and how humans have and still are affecting the 
climate. When working with climate change from an approach within humanities, it is 
necessary to take the cultural, social and historical perspectives into account. This makes 
room for the important point, that how humans perceive climate change and articulate 
narratives affects how action is constructed as either possible or impossible (Sørensen & 
Eskjær, 2014: 17).  
To seek out the core and the aligning threads relating to climate change, migration and 
Kiribati, we have chosen a discourse analytical approach. This specifically allows us to 
display a segment of a given reality, which consists of existing and constantly changing 
discourses. We are committed to the sentiment that everything is socially constructed, which 
is why we also discard the notion of truth. Instead we seek out the possibility for change in 
the dialectic relationship between discourses and social practices. Further, how discourses 
are (re)produced, pursued changed, but most importantly what implications and further 
consequences they impose on human lives will be a thread of consistency throughout the 
study. The discourses articulated by the actors Anote Tong, Pelenise Alofa and John Key 
offer different perspectives on the problems arising due to rising sea levels and changing 
weather phenomena, which impact the small Pacific Island states. Problems that derive from 
greenhouse gas emissions emitted elsewhere in the world, which foster questions of the 
migration, national identity and responsibility. It is somewhat problematic that these issues 
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have not been responded to earlier, and to a much higher degree, since Kiribati will 
disappear in the nearest future. Thus we position ourselves critical towards the lack of 
international action and policy-making and propose how action on several levels is urgently 
needed. The limit for when it is too late to bring down the greenhouse gas emissions has 
arguably been crossed several years ago. Therefore, nations such as Kiribati face an 
uncertain and daunting future of possibly forced migration. 
The year of 2015 was marked by Europe’s first close-up experience with large-scale 
migration in recent time. The influx of people fleeing from political instability and civil war 
from especially Syria has shaken the European nations and thus strengthened the 
nationalistic political stands in many nation-states. This has had several consequences, both 
on the numbers of refugees received but also of how some nations, such as Hungary, have 
even built walls and others, like Denmark, have put up border controls. This was the 
European reaction toward merely one million refugees. 
Problem Field  
The year of 2015 was marked by a close-up experience with large-scale migration in Europe. 
The influx of people fleeing from political instability and civil war in especially Syria has 
shaken the European nations and thus strengthened and fuelled nationalistic politics in many 
nation-states. This has had several consequences on the numbers of refugees received. 
Hungary built a 175 kilometer long fence to control the influx of refugees, meanwhile 
Denmark has imposed strict border controls. This was the European reaction towards merely 
one million refugees out of 60 million people displaced in the world (UNHCR, 06/18/2005). 
The amount of people who are displaced will only increase over time. The reasons why a 
person has to cross borders are only adding up. One rather neglected factor of this is climate 
change and environmental issues. 
Within the last ten years, there has been a rapid increase in the production of scholarly 
work on climate migration (Piguet & Laczko, 2014: 5). Albeit, the publishing of articles 
outlining the issues, presenting plans of action, alternatives and new ways of structuring law 
and policies, nothing worth mentioning has been passed on a global scale to try to 
accommodate the challenges of the people facing the consequences of climate change. 
Although for the Republic of Kiribati this is not a future challenge, but a current one. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) stated in 1990, that “[t]he greatest 
single impact of climate change could be on human migration (…).” (Hastrup & Olwig, 
2012: 1). Since then there has, according to Anthropologist Kirsten Hastrup, been growing 
concerns about the large-scale population movements that may take place because of the 
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increasing effects of climate change (Ibid.). The Oxford Ecologist Norman Myers estimates 
that there will be between 200-250 million people displaced by environmental factors in 
2050 (Burkett, 2011: 3). Myers describes how this figure includes a range of mobile people: 
“At one end there are those people who are driven by environmental factors outright, and at 
the other end are economic migrants who are voluntary opportunists [sic.] rather than 
refugees.” (Myers in Hastrup, 2012: 1) 
The most pressing issue here is: how should people who are displaced by environmental 
factors be categorized? Associate Professor of Law, Maxine Burkett, argues that there is 
generally a lack of consensus on what terminology to use concerning the people who are and 
will be displaced due to climate change. Migration caused by climate change, or in other 
words climate migration, is a complex issue, since there are so many surrounding social and 
economic factors, which makes it difficult to place people affected by climate change into 
one distinct category (Hastrup & Olwig, 2012: 2).  
According to Stephen Humphreys, Associate Professor of International Law, climate 
change is a human rights issue because it will be and is already violating basic human rights, 
which we, according to this international status of the law, should be protected by. These 
rights are rights to health, food, water, shelter, livelihood, migration, resettlement and 
personal security (Humphreys, 2010: 1). These basic rights are threatened by climate change 
and there is no law or other agreement that proposes a solution to these inconsistencies in the 
International Human Rights Law (IHRL). As Humphreys argues, another issue is that 
climate change has not been discussed as a human rights issue in literature and mainstream 
debates considering climate change (Humphreys, 2010: 1). We can ask ourselves why, since 
climate change is the one issue threatening the laws that protect our global, human rights.  
The IHRL is understood as a universal law but a profound critique of this, is that the law 
has been established by nation-state leaders and nations within the United Nations without 
necessarily taking all cultural prerequisites and different conceptions of rights into account. 
In other words, the law is established upon a ‘one size fits all’ model of policy 
implementation. The IRHL presupposes that all are equal and have equal opportunities and 
therefore equal rights but this is a rather romanticized conception of the world. It is already 
well known that not everyone and every country experiences the consequences of climate 
change equally. According to Michel Bourban, Ph.D. student of Philosophy, the 2007-2008 
Human Development Report reads that climate change is already affecting the poorest and 
most vulnerable people in the world (Bourban, 2014: 39). Thus, the consequences of climate 
change do not account for inequalities amongst people e.g. one’s geographical placement 
and one’s socio-economic status. Hence, there is an imbalance between the responsible and 
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the victims of climate change, which the IPCC Report also establishes (Bourban, 2014: 40). 
Tong and other officials from Kiribati have made several requests to the global community 
concerning the severe consequences of climate change, where they call upon action from 
neighboring nations such as New Zealand and Australia. The different actors involved in this 
issue display a constructed arrangement of a world system that decides who can speak 
(Stevenson & Dryzek, 2012: 192). Therefore, questions regarding responsibility must be 
addressed. 
This issue is not only captivating, but it also holds several complexities due to unequal 
power relations, distribution of wealth and corporate interests in Kiribati. A pressing 
question is therefore also: do we even have a global community or is this a common sense 
discourse we turn to, in the hope to establish one? Indian scientist, scholar and 
environmental activist, Vandana Shiva, lays out the distinct critique of how corporates have 
capitalized globalization (Shiva, 2005: 65). The critical angle on globalization or climate 
governance, primarily discards the notion of a global community, because when facing 
challenges and issues that should hopefully concern all of us, the global community has 
shown to fail. Burkett also points out how this is a problem of flawed laws and the lack of 
justice for climate migrants and refugees. Furthermore, it is a problem for states to bind to 
agreements that may affect their own sovereignty (Burkett, 2011: 6). The notion of a global 
community also offers the idea that a state-centric arrangement of the world is outdated. For 
that reason a path to legal agreements across borders should already exist concerning climate 
migration, yet reality shows us something else:  
 
“This is evident in the failure, despite 20 years of global awareness of the problem, to 
agree on a legally workable definition of migrants, much less a well-formulated legal 
and policy framework to govern their migration.” (Burkett, 2011: 6) 
  
Due to the insufficiency of the terminology regarding a person displaced due to climate 
change, it becomes immensely important to detect who has the possibility to ascribe 
meaning to these terms and why. When gathering the different issues displayed within the 
notion of climate migration, several questions are raised and themes are outlined. Discourses 
are powerful and hold social, cultural and political consequences, which raise questions on 
climate change, national identity and responsibility.  
Problem statement  
How do Anote Tong, Pelenise Alofa and John Key discursively construct climate migration? 
How does this relate to power relations, responsibility and national identity? 
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Contextual Framework 
In the following sections we will introduce the context of our study. This entails the impacts 
of climate change, our reasons for choosing the Republic of Kiribati as our case study and an 
outline of the colonial history of the nation.  
Climate change and rising sea levels 
The Republic of Kiribati is a small atoll island state, where rising sea levels will over time 
make this land disappear from the face of the earth. As stated in the extensive framework 
People on the Move in a Changing Climate, by Frank Laczko and Etienne Piguet:  
 
“Sea-level rise has been identified by numerous observers as likely to be the most 
disruptive of climate change effects (...)” and “Atolls have been identified as being 
particularly ‘vulnerable’.”” (Laczko & Piguet, 2014: 197)  
   
Climate change for the I-Kiribatian people is an everyday reality and in general climate 
change for small islands-states imply an increase in extreme weather phenomena: hurricanes, 
floods and even cyclones (Millar et al., 2013: 436). “Extreme weather phenomena have 
already created issues within and the displacement of smaller communities in Vanuatu.” 
(Millar et al., 2016: 437) Meaning that the consequences of sea levels rising are present in 
many of the Pacific Island nations. Further there are 3 principles pointed out by Millar et al., 
which is prominent for only the Small Island Developing States: 
    
“1. They have the greatest exposure to climate change    
2. They are most sensitive to climate change; and 
3. They have the least developed adaptive capacity to climate change, in that they lack 
the necessary institutional, economic, and financial capacity to cope with the adverse 
effects of climate change (and are therefore often reliant on foreign aid in response to 
natural disasters).” (Millar et al., 2013: 436) 
 
One might ask whether this example of climate change consequences for the Small Island 
Developing States is rather new, or it might not be the first example that comes to mind 
when thinking of climate change. Due to already displaced communities in Vanuatu, and the 
pronouncement for Kiribati, these consequences are visible and constituted in scientific 
notions on the Small Island Development States:  
 
“Although many of these impacts were first seen in Africa, inhabitants of SIDS are 
increasingly being confronted with the reality of having to leave their low-lying coastal 
homes.” (Millar et al., 2013: 437) 
 
In line with this pronouncement, Myers states how 200 million people are predicted 
displaced for several reasons by 2050. This includes people who are displaced for 
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environmental reasons (Myers in Hastrup & Olwig, 2012: 1). In the framework of Laczko 
and Piguet, which gathers scholarly work on climate migration, it is also stated that: 
 
“Migrants who move for environmental reasons are also likely to fall into many 
different categories, and not all migration linked to environmental change can be 
described as forced displacement.” (Laczko & Piguet, 2014: 1)  
 
Although the terminology regarding those who are or will be displaced seems to be diffuse, 
climate change and the consequences thereof remain: “the greatest problem facing 
humanity” (Hulme in Hastrup & Olwig, 2012: 2). This is only to underline that it can be 
discussed how these issues are pursued comprehended, but the pressing issue here, is that 
something needs to be done now. For that reason, amongst others explored in this section, 
Kiribati is an interesting case when investigating discourses on climate migration.  
Why Kiribati?  
Our choice of focusing on the Republic of Kiribati functions as a geographical point of 
departure. According to Political Geographer Jon Barnett, the small island states are a 
powerful symbol in discourses on climate change. Therefore, there has already been written 
a lot about climate change and migration in relation to the Pacific Islands (Barnett, 2012: 
170). Barnett critiques how people who speak about social vulnerability to climate change or 
mobility in the Pacific Islands do not live in the Pacific Islands and have little knowledge on 
the matter. Yet he argues: 
 
“None of this is to say that there are no reasons for investigating and talking about the 
links between climate change and mobility. However, much of the discourse from 
climate alarmists is belied by evidence and reason, yet drives the headlines and forces 
policy development.” (Barnett, 2012: 171)  
  
In accordance with this, we argue that it is relevant to examine discourses in relation to 
issues of climate migration. We are aware of our own position and how we will not be able 
to understand the full spectrum and come up with any solutions. Kiribati is also interesting 
as a case study because, as Barnett states, it is one of the few Pacific Islands where there has 
been discourses concerning the risks of large-scale migration due to climate change (Barnett, 
2012: 172). We too are concerned with the discourses on persons who are displaced, thus 
making Kiribati a good point of reference for a discussion of discourses on issues of climate 
migration. It is important to note that when we speak of the discourses on national identity of 
Kiribati we do so from a social constructionist perspective, where every social practice is a 
social construction. This is in order to avoid a victimization of the I-Kiribatian people, since 
we cannot, or should not, speak on behalf of them. We are aware that we will not be able to 
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understand the full perspective of the consequences and complexities for the I-Kiribatian 
people and the Pacific Island nations alike in terms of the challenges arising due to climate 
change. With Kiribati as our point of departure it allows us to investigate the broader notion 
of climate migration. We are not able to examine the feelings and understandings of the 
people of Kiribati e.g. their Christian beliefs, since we do not have access to these. Rather, 
we want to focus on how their national identity is constructed through discourses.  
The Colonial history of migration in the Pacific  
According to Ph.D. student of Geography Thomas Birk, relocation is a fairly common 
phenomenon in the history of the Pacific Islands, as well as the Republic of Kiribati, not 
only in relation to environmental factors but also socioeconomic circumstances (Birk, 2012: 
88). Migration is not a new phenomenon in the Pacific Islands, where it has been a necessary 
measure in difficult times (Birk, 2012: 90). Besides from movements within and between 
islands, there are also examples of displaced communities caused by the British Colonial 
intervention. The relocation of the small Banaban community is an example of this: “In 
1945, the small Banaban community from Ocean Island in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands 
Colony (present-day Kiribati) was relocated to Rabi Island in Fiji.” (McAdam, 2016: 1) The 
Banaban community was relocated due to the lucrative phosphate deposits on Ocean Island. 
Due to the expansion of mining for phosphate, destroying the island, and the premises for 
livelihood of the Banabans, the British government decided to relocate the Banaban 
community to Rabi Island in Fiji. What should also be noted is that the rich reserves of 
phosphate ended up as fertilizer in other countries, mainly Australia and New Zealand 
(Kempf, 2012: 244). Before the Banabans were shipped off to Rabi, the women dressed up 
in gold jewelry expecting to arrive at a vibrant town (McAdam, 2016: 12). But upon their 
arrival, the Banabans were shocked and disappointed by the conditions on the islands, which 
did not fit their expectations: 
 
“According to Banaban accounts, they were misled into thinking that they were moving 
to an established town with roads, cars, and two storey houses, where life would be 
easier than on Ocean Island. (...) On arrival, however, they found no town and very few 
inhabitants, apart from some Solomon Islanders who had stayed behind to work on the 
old coconut plantations.” (McAdam, 2016: 12) 
 
The Banabans compared their relocation to the biblical exodus from Israel, characterizing 
their relocation as forced. Their new residency within the republic of Fiji was also not 
cherished by the Fijians. In an article from the Fiji Times and Herald, around the time of 
their arrival, the author stated that: “If the Fijian people as a whole could be consulted they 
might say that they do not want the Banabans here at all.” (McAdam, 2016: 15) The Fijians 
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primary concerns were that the Banabans would make employment more difficult and 
worsen the economic conditions for the Fijians (McAdam, 2016: 15). What makes the 
example of the Banabans interesting is that they were granted local autonomy within Fiji and 
“also retained special rights of entry, residence, and parliamentary representation in 
Kiribati, even if they were not citizens of that country.” (McAdam, 2016: 2) As of today the 
Banabans hold two citizenships, belonging to both the republic of Kiribati and the republic 
of Fiji, some still living on the Island of Rabi and others in the urban centers of Fiji (Kempf, 
2012: 244). This has not been an easy right to retain, and has earlier been contested by both 
the British colonial government and the Fijian government, e.g. it was forbidden on Fiji to 
have a dual citizenship until 2009. The story of the Banabans is important when discussing 
relocation or migration of large groups of people today. As McAdam argues: “The necessity, 
desirability, and political feasibility of future relocation by Pacific island communities 
remains contested, not least because of these past experiences.” (McAdam, 2016: 53) Thus, 
it is necessary to take the history of migration in Kiribati’s colonial past into account, when 
discussing issues of contemporary climate migration. Furthermore, this will contextualize 
the discussion of power relations.  
Methodology 
Our methodology is based on different approaches within discourse methodology and 
theory. For that reason we have chosen to engage with the framework: Discourse Analysis as 
Theory and Method by Marianne W. Jørgensen and Louise Phillips, as they suggest how the 
discourse approaches differ from each other, and most importantly how they can be 
combined in a multiperspectival approach. They present several theorists, which have 
inspired the thoughts on discourses and scientific traditions, such as Michel Foucault and 
Louis Althusser. The critical discourse analysis by Norman Fairclough and the discourse 
theory by Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe remain the greater contributions to discourse 
theory and methodology when engaging with practical analysis.  
The overall argument of the importance of examining the ways, in which we construct 
the world through language, is that language in part determines how we understand and 
perceive the world. Thus, we will approach knowledge and power through a social 
constructionist perspective. Different concept and signs are ascribed meaning through 
discourses, as argued by Jørgensen and Phillips:  
 
“The overall idea of discourse theory is that social phenomena are never finished or 
total. Meaning can never be ultimately fixed and this opens up the way for constant 
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social struggles about definitions of society and identity, with resulting social effects.” 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 24) 
 
Therefore, discourses are an important form of social practice, which reproduce and change 
knowledge, identities, social relations and power. As Jørgensen and Phillips also argue, we 
do not contend that there is no physical reality, but that we only have access to physical 
objects - and they only gain meaning - through discourses. Thus, the world is constructed 
through our understandings, interpretations and representations. 
In accordance with our social constructionist perspective, we find it important to detect 
how Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory and Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis 
differ. Further, it is important to reveal and constitute our own position in relation to these 
differences and similarities. To do that in a comprehensible way, the most important focal 
points and terms in the scope of discourse theory and methodology will be reviewed in turn. 
Jørgensen and Phillips argue that these two approaches share more or less the same view on 
discourses, thus they are often combined in a discourse analysis as suggested in a 
multiperspectival approach (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 153).  
Social practice  
When reviewing the notion of social practice and when determining the weight and power of 
discourses in each of these frameworks, it is possible to distinguish a difference between the 
approaches of Fairclough and Laclau & Mouffe. In line with this Jørgensen and Phillips 
question: “First, there is disagreement as to the ‘scope’ of discourses: do they constitute the 
social completely, or are they themselves partly constituted by other aspects of the social?” 
(Jørgensen & Phillips 2010: 2)  
Laclau and Mouffe claim that our only access to the physical world is through 
discourses, in contrast to Fairclough who states that there are both discursive and non-
discursive moments. Not everything is upheld and reproduced by the power of discourses. 
We do acknowledge the non-discursive and therefore we ascribe to Fairclough’s approach. 
Due to the overall consideration that: “Fairclough confines the term, discourse, to semiotic 
systems such as language and images in contrast to Laclau and Mouffe, who treat all social 
practice as discourse.” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 67) Fairclough emphasizes the 
dialectical process between discourses and social practice (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 65). 
This is where we see a problem in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis, since they do not 
recognize access to social practices outside the discourses. In this study we view social 
practice as part of a dialectical process, this means that the discourses constitute and are 
constituted by social practice.  
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An example of the non-discursive and social practice could be: The Danish 
Constitution, a collection of laws. We view these as formed through discourses. Yet certain 
discourses challenge these laws, they do not necessarily change for that reason. Using non-
discursive aspects as part of the discourse analysis brings the possibility of including 
theories on issues of migration due to climate change. However, it is important to note that 
structures are not static and thus changeable. This exemplifies the slight difference between 
Fairclough and Laclau & Mouffe’s approaches to discourse analysis, which contemplates 
how everything changes through discourses only. We acknowledge that we understand the 
world through discourses following Laclau and Mouffe & Fairclough, but modified with 
Fairclough’s idea that social practice plays an important role in shaping and reflecting upon 
discourses, which together creates social structures (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 61). The 
impact of engaging with Fairclough’s notion of a dialectical process will be visible and 
clarified in our tool and further in the analysis. 
Language 
The role of language in a discursive approach is extraordinarily important, as discourses and 
language are mainly the ways in which we construct and understand the world. Laclau & 
Mouffe’s approach to language tends to be funded more in a belief, that language is the way 
to express discourses and since everything is constituted through discourses, then people are 
masters of language (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 61). The concepts and terms from Laclau 
& Mouffe are fairly applicable, when it comes to language, which facilitate a semiotic 
approach to text analysis. The concepts and terms from Laclau and Mouffe offer a more 
deconstructive approach than the linguistic approach from Fairclough, which is more 
interpretive (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 66). Laclau and Mouffe’s terms: nodal points, 
moments and myths including others will be applied in our study. This is to understand the 
use of language and specific signs, which are ascribed meaning to, yet we adhere to the 
dialectical process between social practices and discourses. A way to understand how 
Fairclough views language is through the three dimensional model: text, discursive practice 
and social practice (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 65).  
 The aim of discourse analysis is to map out the processes in which signs, hence 
meanings, are momentarily fixed. In these processes some fixations of meaning become so 
conventionalized that we think of them as natural. This will also be the focal point in which 
Laclau & Mouffe and Fairclough can be merged, as they support this overall aim (Jørgensen 
& Phillips, 2010: 25-26). Another important aspect to note is that the researcher’s job is not 
to reveal the true meaning of the discourse. There is no such thing as a true meaning of a 
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discourse. Our “(...) starting point is that reality can never be reached outside discourses 
and so it is discourse itself that has become the object of analysis.” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 
2010: 21). The main channel to the constructions of a given reality is thus through language, 
discourses and social practices, although it is not possible to reach or to display one true 
reality in the analysis of language or discourses.  
Group formation and identity 
Discourse theory views group identities as solely discursive; identity - individual and 
collective - is constituted within discourses because we as humans have constructed them 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 7). Therefore, social groups exist and people are placed in 
categories, but these categories and groupings only exist because they are constructed 
through discourses. In this view, the categories are able to adjust. No social grouping is 
determined, but change is difficult; “‘Society’ is at all times partly structured, but only 
partly and temporarily.” (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2010: 39)  
According to Jørgensen and Phillips, both Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis and 
Fairclough’s critical discourse theory are critical of the traditional Western conception of 
people as autonomous subjects. They view subjects as decentered and changeable, and 
therefore they focus on the constructions of these. Our approach will be in accordance with 
this; we do not believe that people are placed in static groupings, which are objective and 
real. We do believe that the categories, of which identities are constructed within, are 
constructed and can be reconstructed; however difficult this may be. According to 
Fairclough, structures are socially created, but hard to change (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 
54). We acknowledge the possibility for change of structures and the perspective that 
discursive practices contribute to the creation and reproduction of unequal power relations 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 63).  
When viewing identities as produced by discourses, an important component in this 
process is representation. Representation is how people are only positioned in groups when 
someone speaks of, to, or on behalf of them (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 45). Thus, a group 
identity is formed through representation and often constructed in relation to what it is not. 
When thinking of applying group formation and representation in a discourse analysis, it 
brings to mind how representations can enable static categories, e.g. a constructed group can 
be difficult to change or deconstruct, because it has become a common sense understanding. 
Thus we seek to investigate and account for the way that people are categorized and how 
power relations are (re)produced. 
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Order of discourses 
The process of the construction of groups is political, including various power relations. 
Jørgensen and Phillips describe Laclau and Mouffe’s approach to power, which has its roots 
in Foucault’s theory of power: 
  
“Power is not something you can make disappear: we are dependent on living in a social 
order and the social order is always constituted in power. But we are not dependent on 
living in a particular social order, and the exclusion of other social orders is also one of 
the effects of power.” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 37)  
 
In Laclau and Mouffe’s perspective power is constitutive, but not fixed. This is similar to 
Fairclough’s approach to power, where struggles to obtain hegemony occur between 
discourses. A hegemonic discourse can be considered to be a common sense understanding - 
which initially serves to exclude other understandings of the world - and is fixed until a new 
discourse takes its place. In Fairclough’s approach, the concept of hegemony functions to 
give us access to how discourses are a part of social practices involving power relations: 
“discursive practice can be seen as an aspect of a hegemonic struggle that contributes to the 
reproduction and transformation of the order of discourse of which it is part (...).” 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 76) Fairclough draws on Antonio Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony, where power is seen as negotiated (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 91). This also 
applies to Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of an antagonistic struggle for hegemony. The two 
approaches are therefore somewhat similar, since Fairclough’s concept, order of discourse, 
also refers to a struggle between discourses - although merely in the same terrain of 
discourses - in which they compete to achieve hegemony. This means that not all discourses 
struggle to reach hegemony, but merely the ones who are arguably in the same field. We 
apply Fairclough’s term order of discourse to Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of an 
antagonistic struggle. Fairclough’s approach seeks to make unequal power relations visible 
and thereby contribute to social change. We aim to apply this view of power as 
contemporarily fixed moments within antagonistic struggles in the order of discourses. The 
outcome of these hegemonic processes, whereby no visible conflicts occur, creates 
naturalized ways of viewing the world. 
Visual display of multiperspectival approach 
In the following schematic overview we have outlined Laclau and Mouffe and Fairclough’s 
approach to social practice, language, group formation and hegemony. In the fourth column 
we outline our approach to the same categories, based either on a fusion of the two discourse 
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approaches or mainly on either the approach of Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis or the 
approach of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory. 
Concepts  Laclau and Mouffe 
Discourse Theory 
Fairclough 
Critical Discourse 
Analysis 
Our Position 
Social practice “Laclau and Mouffe’s 
discourse theory tends 
to view individuals 
solely as subjects of 
discourse.” (Jørgensen 
& Phillips, 2010: 7) 
 
“As social practice, 
discourse is in a 
dialectical relationship 
with other social 
dimensions. It does not 
just contribute to the 
shaping and reshaping 
of social structures but 
also reflects them.” 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 
2010: 61) 
 
Fairclough: The 
social is constituted 
through discourse and 
social practices, in a 
dialectic process.  
Language “The starting point is 
that reality can never 
be reached outside 
discourses and so it is 
discourse itself that has 
become the object of 
analysis.” (Jørgensen 
& Phillips, 2010: 21) 
“(...) text analysis alone 
is not sufficient for 
discourse analysis, as it 
does not shed light on 
the links between texts 
and societal and 
cultural processes and 
structures. An 
interdisciplinary 
perspective is needed in 
which one combines 
textual and social 
analysis.” (Jørgensen & 
Phillips, 2010: 65) 
Fusion: People are 
masters and slaves of 
language, which 
means that structures 
do exist, but they are 
not unchangeable or 
static. How we 
ascribe meaning to 
different signs, and 
how common sense 
understandings are 
created through 
language, can be 
detected with nodal 
points, myths etc.  
Group 
Formation 
“Laclau and Mouffe 
claim that there are no 
objective conditions 
that determine into 
which groups the 
social space is divided. 
(…) People are 
constituted as groups 
through a process by 
which some 
possibilities of 
identification are put 
forward as relevant 
while others are 
ignored.” (Jørgensen & 
Phillips, 2010: 55) 
“Discourse contributes 
to the construction of: 
social identities; social 
relations; and systems 
of knowledge and 
meaning. Thus 
discourse has three 
functions (...)” 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 
2010: 67) 
 
Fusion: All group 
identities are 
constructed through 
discourses, and the 
discourses are 
influenced by 
structures of power. 
We are therefore both 
masters and slaves of 
language.  
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Hegemony Antagonistic struggle: 
“‘Hegemony’ is 
similar to ‘discourse’ 
because both terms 
denote a fixation of 
elements in moments. 
But the hegemonic 
intervention achieves 
this fixation across 
discourses that collide 
antagonistically.” 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 
2010: 48) 
Order of discourse: 
“(...) discursive practice 
can be seen as an 
aspect of a hegemonic 
struggle that 
contributes to the 
reproduction and 
transformation of the 
order of discourse of 
which it is part (...)” 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 
2010: 76) 
Fusion: Hegemony is 
achieved in an 
antagonistic struggle 
within an order of 
discourse. Not all 
discourses struggle to 
reach hegemony, but 
merely the ones who 
are in the same field. 
Power is a structural 
result of these 
processes.  
Multiperspectival approach 
We have chosen to apply a multiperspectival approach that draws on different discursive 
theories and methods - both theories of discourse and non-discursive theories - in order to 
examine a phenomenon and its complexities from different angles and perspectives 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 153-154). Language and the social world should be viewed, 
analyzed and interpreted from different perspectives (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 155). On 
the basis of this we have constructed a multiperspectival tool.  
In the following we will outline the ways in which we will structure our analysis on the 
basis of critical discourse analysis and discourse theory. As a way of structuring our 
analysis, we want to apply Fairclough’s three-dimensional model as an analytical frame. It 
consists of three dimensions: 1) Text 2) Discursive practice 3) Social practice (Jørgensen & 
Phillips, 2010: 68). The aim of the first dimension is to bring forth the articulated discourses. 
According to Fairclough, it becomes possible to make the present discourses visible by using 
a set of tools through a detailed analysis of the linguistic characteristics of a text (Jørgensen 
& Phillips, 2010: 83) This is where we become multiperspectival in practice. We have 
chosen to apply the analytical concepts from Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory instead 
of merely applying Fairclough’s own tool of concepts from his critical discourse analysis. 
Our reason for choosing Laclau and Mouffe’s concepts is due to the fact that their analytical 
concepts are built upon a semiotic tradition and function well in outlining discourses where 
there is discursive struggle in a text. In the analysis of the second dimension, the discursive 
practice, the production and consumption of text is in focus. This means that an analysis of 
the discursive practice entails how authors of texts write themselves into an already existing 
discourse and how the receiver of the text also uses existing discourses in the interpretation 
of the text (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 69). We have chosen to focus on Fairclough’s notion 
of intertextuality and interdiscursivity because they enable us to contextualize our cases 
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within a broader textual-historical framework. This dimension also functions as a direct link 
between the first and third dimension: “The relationship between texts and the social 
practice is mediated by discursive practice. Hence it is only through discursive practice (...) 
that texts shape and are shaped by social practice.” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 69) Hence, 
the second dimension connects the textual analysis with our theoretical perspectives. In the 
analysis of the third dimension consists of the analysis of the broader social practice, which 
also includes the two former dimensions in which the groundwork has been made. The first 
two dimensions enable us to draw these theoretical lines into the social practice of 
discourses. The goal with the third dimension is to cast light on the surrounding non-
discursive, social and cultural structures, which are constitutive for the contextual frame of 
the discursive practice (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 86). The three dimensions can be 
understood as fluid and interconnected, and do not necessarily have to be understood or 
analyzed separately.  We will work with the three-dimensional model across the dimensions, 
although we will only apply the chosen terms and concepts when it makes sense according 
to the context of the discourses and the applied theory. 
Our tool  
In the following we will outline the design of our multiperspectival tool and the concepts we 
have chosen to use in the analysis. Further we will see to make a clarification of how the 
combination of discourse theory and critical discourse analysis create the most meaningful 
and comprehensible approach in relation to our cases.  
Dimension 1: Text 
To begin with, we wish to analyze how discourses are textually articulated. This is based on 
the text dimension from the three-dimensional model. In the following we will outline and 
define the concepts from discourse theory.  
 
Applied Concepts Definition 
Articulation Articulation is every social practice. An articulation creates a 
connection between elements so that the content of the element is 
changed (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 28). 
Hegemony/Antagonis
tic struggle 
Sometimes discourses can be conflicting and this is where 
antagonisms occur. These antagonisms battle each other and can 
be dissolved through hegemonic interventions. When one 
discourse dominates over the others a hegemonic intervention has 
succeeded (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 48). 
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Moment All signs that constitute a discourse are called moments and these 
signs get their meaning from the other signs and from what they 
are not (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 26). 
Nodal Points  
 
 
A nodal point is a sign that stands in relation to other signs. The 
other signs gather their meaning from their relation to the nodal 
point (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 26). 
Chain of Equivalence 
 
Signs have no meaning by themselves, but are ascribed meaning 
when put into relation to other signs, which then creates a chain of 
meaning. This is called a chain of equivalence (Jørgensen & 
Phillips, 2010: 50). 
Myth The concept of myths entails how some discourses in society 
become so natural that they are perceived as objective reality and 
this way embedded in talk and other actions (Jørgensen & 
Phillips, 2010: 40). 
 
These concepts function as our analytical grip in the initial textual analysis when displaying 
the articulated discourses in our three cases. To begin with, we have read the articulations of 
our three actors in which the articulated discourses are visualized. Secondly, the nodal point 
or the representation of an identity is brought to light. In order to find out how the nodal 
point or identity acquire meaning, we have analyzed the moments that are equivalent to the 
nodal point. This way the discourses will be displayed and it then becomes possible to 
examine the articulations of myths, along with the concepts of antagonistic struggle and 
hegemony. Antagonistic struggle and hegemony are used to show how different discourses 
at times struggle to assign meaning to a specific nodal point. Whereas the concept myth is 
used to clarify how common senses are articulated and leaves parts of the social world 
uncontested and as natural or objective.  
Dimension 2: Discursive practice  
The second dimension within the model covers the analysis of discursive practice. Within 
this dimension of the discursive practice we will apply Fairclough’s concept of 
intertextuality and interdiscursivity. 
Intertextuality covers the conception of how it is practically impossible to create text 
without drawing on earlier texts. According to Fairclough, one cannot avoid using words and 
phrases, stated by others previously (Fairclough in Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 73). 
Interdiscursivity is a branch of intertextuality and is thus closely related when applied in the 
analysis. The concept of interdiscursivity appears in a text when different discourses are 
articulated. By articulating discourses in new ways the order of discourse changes. When 
one order of discourse changes, other related orders of discourses change as well. When new 
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and complex types of discourses are modified a new discourse occurs. This is a visualization 
of, and a driving force in change - both within the discourse and in socio-cultural change 
because of its dialectical relationship. This indicates that, when discourses are articulated in 
more well established terms, the dominant discourses are reproduced, in which the dominant 
social order is stabilized and maintained (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 73).  These concepts 
will be applied as a way of clarifying the context and links of the discourses, how the 
discourses are (re)produced in a given text and how this relates to a historical context. 
Fairclough differs between a high and a low level of interdiscursivity. When discourses 
change there is a high level of interdiscursivity and when there is a reproduction of an 
already established order there is a low level of interdiscursivity (Jørgensen & Phillips, 
2010: 82-83). This is relevant in terms of being able to highlight the dominant discourses 
through a visualization of the reproduction of discourses on an interdiscursive level. This is 
linked to its socio-cultural and historical context in the following dimension. 
Dimension 3: Social practice 
The third dimension brings the discursive practice into a broader net of understandings of the 
social practice. We view this as an advantage in Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis 
because we believe that it is important to examine the discourses within their theoretical and 
societal context to highlight the complexities, not only within discursive practice.  
Theoretical introduction 
In order to create a broad theoretical framework, we draw on social and cultural theories 
when outlining the dimension of social practice. All of the theories used in the analysis 
handle climate change as a phenomenon and an issue, but they all derive from different 
approaches thus showing the wide range of complexities connected to climate change. This 
contributes to a nuanced analysis, which is essential for the topic since it is manifold in its 
issues. We do not intend to conduct a full theoretical outline of every theory used. Instead 
we will briefly introduce the authors, their theories and concepts, which we will apply in the 
analysis and discussion where they are relevant.  
Understanding climate change  
We make use of the following theoretical perspectives when analyzing the different 
articulated discourses regarding climate change. The theories are used as perspectives to 
understand the contextual framework when trying to correlate our discourse analysis and the 
non-discursive dimension. 
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The framework Human Rights and Climate Change is edited by Stephen Humphreys 
and written by different authors all with a background in international law: Humphreys, 
Simon Caney, Dinah Shelton, Peter Newell and Sam Adelman. The framework raises 
questions on how the effects of climate change are increasingly felt and experienced and 
how these concerns are or should be concerns of human rights law, since the effects of 
climate change continue to exceed certain human rights. We will not apply the entire 
framework as a theoretical perspective but only the chapter by Humphreys: Competing 
claims, human rights and climate harms and the chapter Climate change, human rights and 
moral thresholds by Caney. Humphreys is an Associate Professor of International Law and 
former Research Director at the International Council on Human Rights Policy in Geneva. 
He has a PhD from Cambridge and a Master’s degree in law from SOAS (LSE Law, n.d.). 
Caney contributes with his article where he argues that a human rights perspective is a solid 
way of evaluating effects of climate change. He is a professor in Political Theory at the 
University of Oxford and author to several publications and articles in politics and 
philosophy journals. Furthermore, he works with issues including ethical issues surrounding 
global poverty and climate change (Simon Caney, n.d.). 
Climate Change and Human Mobility by Kirsten Hastrup and Karen Fog Olwig 
examines emerging patterns of migration in relation to climate change. It draws on an 
interdisciplinary approach, including anthropology and geography and argues why climate 
change and human mobility demands attention. Hastrup is a professor of anthropology at the 
University of Copenhagen. She has carried out extensive research on human rights and legal 
language. Olwig is a professor at the Department of Anthropology at the University of 
Copenhagen. She has published various studies within the field of migration and the 
significance of migration as a social and cultural resource (Hastrup & Olwig, 2012: no 
page).  
The Ethical Implications of Sea-Level Rise Due to Climate Change by Sujatha Byravan 
and Sudhir Chella Rajan in Ethics and International Affairs has an interdisciplinary 
approach to the complexities of rising sea-levels due to climate change. Byravan has a 
scientific, technologic and financial background (Revolvy, n.d.) and Rajan has a background 
in humanities and social sciences (Tellus Institute for a Great Transition, n.d.). This paper 
focuses on the ethical implications of climate change, working with themes of human rights, 
responsibility and the terminology of climate exiles. Their interdisciplinary backgrounds in 
natural sciences, social sciences and humanities all focusing on climate change makes them 
interesting to include in our study.  
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In the article, Climate Change, Human Rights and the Problem of Motivation in De 
Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics, Michel Bourban 
discusses some of the human rights that are threatened by global warming and climate 
justice. Bourban has a background in philosophy from the University of Lausanne (Unil, 
n.d.) and has a normative approach to climate injustices. Therefore he also focuses on the 
global inequalities between, what he calls, well-off citizens in developed countries and 
citizens in poorer regions of the world. These theories enable us to bring the discourses on 
climate change into a context of the social practice. Climate change is treated from 
perspectives of human rights, migration and mobility, implications from rising sea-levels, 
climate injustice, and ethical implications.  
Understanding representations of identity 
The previous listed theoretical perspectives are useful when examining the fluid notion of 
climate change, but when trying to understand how the consequences of climate change can 
affect national identity and local communities, they fall short, which is why we include the 
following theoretical contributions. 
The first text Climate change, migration, and Christianity in Oceania by Wolfgang 
Kempf, Professor in the Institute of Ethnology at the University of Göttingen, will be applied 
to shed light on the role of the church on Kiribati in relation to issues of climate change. This 
is an attempt to acquire a more nuanced understanding of the representations of the national 
identity of I-Kiribatians.  
On the risks of engineering mobility to reduce vulnerability to climate change: insights 
from a small island state is written by Jon Barnett, Professor in the Department of Resource 
Management and Geography at the University of Melbourne. This is applied to explain 
issues related to large-scale migration due to climate change and what consequences this 
may have for those that choose to stay. This relates to the prospects of migration for the 
people of Kiribati.  
Terminology and responsibility 
The following theoretical perspectives enable us to analyze discourses in relation to 
responsibility and the distribution of power in a globalizing world, and provide perspectives 
on how to take action on a national, regional and global scale. 
James Morrissey presents the term discursive legitimacy in the chapter: Contextualizing 
links between migration and environmental change in the northern Ethiopia, in the 
anthology by Hastrup & Olwig, (Hastrup & Olwig, 2012: vii). Morrissey is a Doctor of 
Philosophy and current researcher at America Oxfam and he has his research background in 
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environment and sustainability. His contribution will be used in the discussion of the 
terminologies of a person who is displaced. Furthermore, a legal framework will be 
presented, which will be a contribution from Michele Klein Solomon and Dr. Koko Warner 
which derives from the anthology Threatened Island Nations in which their chapter 
Protection of Persons displaced as a result of Climate Change: Existing tools and emerging 
frameworks is included. Solomon is a researcher for International Organization for 
Migration (Global Forum on Migration & Development: n.d.) and Warner is Head of the 
Environmental Migration, Social Vulnerability and Adaptation Section (United Nations 
University, Migration Network, n.d.).  
One World - the Ethics of Globalization by Peter Albert David Singer is concerned with 
issues regarding ethics of globalization. Here, Singer writes on how global organizations and 
politics influence nations situated in a globalizing world. He is first and foremost devoted to 
the field of bioethics and one of the founders of the Animal Rights Movement, but more 
importantly he is an environmental and civil rights activist (Bio: n.d.). Singer is an 
Australian political scholar and philosopher. His framework will be applied in order to argue 
more general points on ethics and moralities concerning the processes of globalization.  
Vandana Shiva’s framework: Earth Democracy will be used in the analysis and further 
in the discussion. The concept Earth Democracy, builds upon a distinct critique of 
globalization, as overtaken by corporates. Given that she is a scientist herself, the framework 
partially functions as a normative rights philosophic approach towards the world, but also as 
a suggestion for how the world should be re-arranged. Corporate globalization is described 
as the current status of the world, which builds upon corporate interests, in a world where 
everything is for sale. The overconsumption from the First World is highlighted as another 
important part of her critique on globalization, and her description of the current world 
status.  She is an Indian scholar, environmental activist and scientist. Shiva is known for her 
partnerships with local communities and her engagement in social movements (Dr. Vandana 
Shiva, n.d.).  
Another chapter from the framework Threatened Island Nations written by Dr. Jenny 
Grote Stoutenburg: When do States Disappear?: Thresholds of effective statehood and the 
continued recognition of “Deterritorialized” Island states, will be used in our analysis and 
discussion in order to problematize the law-perspective of state responsibility towards other 
states. Stoutenburg is an associate Legal Officer at the International Court of Justice (Brill, 
n.d). 
In Threatened Island Nations the chapter Nation Ex-Situ is written by Hawaiian Maxine 
Burkett, Associate Professor of Law. Ex-Situ nationhood entails a status for the Pacific 
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Islands threatened to lose their territory due to the rising sea level, to continue to exist as a 
sovereign state with the same rights and benefits that sovereignty offers. This would serve as 
a constant political entity, which would ensure the protection of the people forced to move 
from their homes and birthplace, even when the citizens gain residency in other states. 
Therefore, it would be a legal framework that would preserve the state, its resources and the 
wellbeing of its people even though it would be without territory (Burkett, 2013: 90). This 
concerns the fact that, when nation-states such as Kiribati lose their territory to the rising sea 
levels, then what will happen to their sovereign rights as nation-states within the 
international community? Burkett has written within the diverse area of climate law with 
particular focus on climate change and justice in vulnerable communities both within the 
United States and on a global scale (William S. Richardson School of Law, n.d.). We use 
Nation Ex-Situ to explore and emphasize the need for an international development of a 
legal framework to encounter the future challenges that will arise when small island nations 
is swallowed by the Pacific Ocean.   
The chapter Could a Small Island successfully sue a Big Emitter? Pursuing a legal 
theory and a venue for climate justice by Jacob David Werksman from Threatened Island 
Nations will be applied in the analysis and further in the discussion, to draw on legal 
implications for Kiribati towards some of the neighboring countries and the so-called big 
emitter nations. The chapter leans toward a more normative approach, and is a review of 
failing existing categories and legal frameworks towards climate migration. Werksman is an 
International Lawyer specialized in International Environmental Law. He is the principal 
advisor for the Directorate General for Climate Action (International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development, n.d.).  
By analyzing articulated discourses, on both issues of the local and the global scale, 
notions such as discursive legitimacy, Earth democracy and Nation Ex-Situ along with 
perspectives on the ethics of globalization, a field for understanding the discursive practice 
in the context of the social practice is provided. Furthermore, the scholars are chosen 
because of how their theories help nuance and overlap in the problem at hand. Another 
argument for choosing these scholars, is their different geographical positions: Australia, 
India, Denmark, The United Kingdom, The United States and Hawaii, which outlines a 
broad geographical arena. We perceive this as an advantage because of the way we 
understand the issues of climate change as having to be dealt with nationally, regionally and 
globally. Thus the different geographical perspectives contribute to and correlate with our 
nuanced approach to the manifold and complex issues of climate change and migration. 
Nevertheless, we are aware that these perspectives only represents a small section of the 
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wide range of theories from all geographical regions of the world concerning our field of 
interest.  
Thematic overview 
In the following, the structure of our analysis will be explained and argued for. We have 
chosen to organize the analysis around the following three major themes: 
 
1. Climate change  
2. National identity  
3. Responsibility 
 
These themes are the product of our discourse analysis when finding the nodal points, which 
we saw as essential for this project. These are not merely themes, but also a visual guideline 
for what we have found and wanted to elaborate on in a broader theoretical perspective. By 
letting the articulated discourses in our three cases pave the way, we have made sure that the 
discourses is our point of departure in our research and choice of theory. The themes are 
therefore also a part of a validating process to make sure that we did not let our common 
senses and initial ideas and understandings of the field take over. Furthermore, by choosing a 
thematic structure and applying our tool, it allows us to engage with different theoretical 
contributions, which are all within the scope of social science in dimension two and three. 
Given that the analysis follows a thematic structure, we are also able to draw on the different 
cases and discourses freely throughout the analysis. This enables us to connect the 
discourses when wanting to bring forth the complexities of climate change and migration 
permeated by power relations. 
Introduction to the chosen cases 
We have chosen three cases for analysis and these three cases have been chosen on behalf of 
two factors: the messenger and the occasion to speak. We focus on choosing actors who can 
grant us access to the problems of climate migration from Kiribati. This is an attempt to keep 
the discussion within the geographical framework of our case. We are aware that analyzing 
discourses from an actor does not grant us access to discourses amongst the broader I-
Kiribatian people and this is therefore not our aim. Nevertheless, by examining discourses 
from a local Kiribatian context through our chosen cases, we will have access to discuss the 
complex issues of climate migration. We find this highly relevant to do, seeing as climate 
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migration is a pressing issue, which is not granted enough attention. First, we have chosen to 
analyze discourses present in a TED talk with Anote Tong, former President of the Republic 
of Kiribati and secondly, a radio interview with Pelenise Alofa, National Coordinator of the 
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), Kiribati Climate Action Network (KiriCAN). Our 
third case study is a newscast interview with the Prime Minister of New Zealand, John Key, 
about denying asylum to one of the world’s first so-called climate refugees, Ioane Teitiota. 
This is chosen in order to gain access to discourses from an opposing position than those of 
Tong and Alofa. Key is an actor who grants us access to a political discursive arena deriving 
from New Zealand in relation to Kiribati.  
In the following sections we will present the three case studies. First, the TED talk with 
Tong, secondly the interview with Alofa and finally the interview with Key and the context 
of denying Teitiota asylum.  
TED talk with Anote Tong 
The TED talk with Tong: My country will be underwater soon - unless we work together, is 
from October 2015, during his presidential term. Tong has, according to TED: “built 
worldwide awareness of the potentially devastating impacts of climate change.” (TED, n.d.) 
We found him particularly interesting due to the fact that he, at several occasions, addresses 
the impacts of climate change and the importance of working against them. He has held 
several speeches concerning climate change in International forums, amongst others at 
COP21, where he advocates to nation-state leaders to work together towards reducing 
consequences of climate change. Tong was president of the Republic of Kiribati from 2003 
until 2016, winning three presidential elections. Apart from this, Tong was also Head of 
State and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Immigration.  
According to TED, Tong has on many occasions stated that:  
 
“Kiribati may cease to exist altogether and that its entire population may need to be 
resettled not as climate change refugees but as citizens who migrate on merit and with 
dignity.” (TED, n.d.)  
 
His views on climate change, the global community and migration are therefore interesting 
to examine in relation to our themes, giving us access to a political perspective of Kiribati. 
Meanwhile, the choice of analyzing the TED talk with Tong gives us access to his 
perspectives on the problems, which he is able to elaborate on, and not merely a planned, 
political presentation at a UN assembly. (TED, n.d.) 
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Radio interview with Pelenise Alofa 
The interview with Pelenise Alofa: Pelenise Alofa on Kiribati and Climate Change, is a 
radio interview hosted by ABC Local Sunday Nights, which is a weekly national program on 
the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). The program, according to themselves: 
“opens up conversations on important issues concerning religion, spirituality, ethics and 
values.” (ABC Local, n.d.) The ABC included this interview with Alofa one week after a 
cyclone on Vanuatu, a Pacific Island close to Kiribati. This occurrence is important in this 
context, seeing as these natural phenomena are occurring more often in the Pacific Islands, 
making the islands more or less inhabitable over time. Alofa, who is National Coordinator 
for the KiriCan, is according to ABC Local Sunday Nights: “a remarkable Pacific 
ambassador on the impact of Climate Change.” (ABC Local, n.d.) We find her background 
in KiriCan and her call for an intertwinement of climate change and human rights to be 
interesting in this study. Furthermore, she has insight to local I-Kiribatian population, and 
has religious and local perspectives on the aspects of migration. Since this is an interview, 
we are aware that the questions and answers affect the interaction between the interviewer 
John Cleary and Alofa. It is therefor important to take into account, that the interview is 
framed in a specific way and with a specific agenda.  
Newscast interview with John Key 
The newscast interview with Key is hosted by Stuff, an award winning New Zealandish 
news and information site. According to the website Stuff covers every aspect of news and 
information ranging between national and international news, entertainment, weather and 
sports, among others (Stuff, n.d.). The article is posted on their national page.  
The reason we chose to include an interview with Key was our interest in the world’s 
first apparent climate refugee, Ioane Teitiota. Our interest in his story occurred because of 
the attention given to his specific case by international media. He left Kiribati to live in New 
Zealand because of his worsening living conditions in Kiribati. In 2011 he was denied 
asylum, since the New Zealand National Party (National Party) decided the living conditions 
in Kiribati to be good enough to live in, ruling Teitiota’s case to be inadequate (BBC: 2015). 
Teitiota’s wife said about her husband, herself and their kids being in New Zealand: “They 
said we are overstayers but we are not. We are trying to find a better life for the kids (...).” 
(BBC, 2015) Key names Teitiota an overstayer, due to lack of credibility in his argument. 
Although Teitiota’s own lawyers argued the following in court: 
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“(...) he and his family would suffer harm if forced to return to Kiribati because of the 
combined pressures of over-population and rising sea levels, and that he would be 
"persecuted passively" by the circumstances there.” (BBC, 2015) 
 
He was supposed to appeal for help from the United Nations refugee agency, but never got 
to do so. We were therefore originally interested in Teitiota’s positioning, but found it more 
relevant to examine a political discourse from New Zealand and how the nation positions 
itself in relation to climate change and climate migration. The National Party is a center-
right party, which emphasizes immigration policy as a main issue (NBR, 2015). This is 
relevant in relation to our study, since the long term political goals of the governing party 
will essentially have a great impact on the nation’s adaptation to climate change and their 
reception, or lack of same, of future (and already beginning) migration from Pacific Islands. 
This case will give us access to discuss the complexity of climate migration, in the sense that 
nations like New Zealand have significant power in the international arena as a developed 
country1. Due to their immigration and climate change policies.  
Analysis  
The aim of the analysis is to outline how Tong, Alofa and Key discursively construct climate 
migration in order for us to discuss the contextual relations and challenges of climate 
migration. Since the analysis is thematically structured we start out by analyzing the present 
discourses on climate change in relation to climate migration. Climate change is a 
challenging concept to grasp, but the understandings of it can have social and cultural 
consequences. 
Climate change is already here 
Tong has for many years been concerned with climate change and its effects - especially in 
his homeland. As he says in the TED talk, climate change was yet to be acknowledged 
before 2007 as being human-induced. What he argues is that there is enough evidence now 
to prove that climate change is a present matter and that it is a challenge, which must be 
taken seriously. Climate change is a nodal point in the interview, since it functions as a 
                                                
1 We are aware that the binary of developed and developing nations is an unnuanced division of a number of nations, which 
all differ culturally, religiously and economically. We find this division relatively outdated, seeing as many of the so-called 
developing and developed nations have changed distinctively since the categorical division was defined meanwhile we are 
critical towards the notion of development. Our reason of applying the terminology is due to a lack of better. In other 
contexts the use of the terminology of the geographical global north and south could be used, but since Australia and New 
Zealand, whom we often refer to, are in the same geographical area as Kiribati and the Pacific Islands, this would not make 
sense to apply in this project. 
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privileged sign, which is given meaning in relation to the other moments surrounding it, all 
of which are interrelated.  
Tong’s construction of climate change is equivalent with the sign real since it is 
constructed as a real issue because there no longer seems to be any controversy among the 
scientists:  
 
“(...) then [when Tong started his presidency in 2003] there was still this controversy 
among the scientists whether it was human-induced, whether it was real or it wasn’t. But 
I think that that debate was fairly much concluded in 2007 with the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the IPCC, which made a categorical statement that it is real, it’s human-
induced, and it’s predicting some very serious scenarios for countries like mine.” 
(Appendix 3: 1)  
 
Tong therefore appeals to a discourse where climate change is human-induced and a 
scientific fact. This discourse of climate change is not solely produced by Tong, but rather it 
is a reproduction of an already existing discourse of anthropogenic climate change, which 
has characterized the debate on climate change for many years. Amongst many fields of 
science, this is established as a fact. In connection to this, Nasa Global Climate Change 
writes on their homepage: 
 
“Observations throughout the world make it clear that climate change is occurring, and 
rigorous scientific research demonstrates that the greenhouse gases emitted by human 
activities are the primary driver.” (Nasa Global Climate Change, n.d.) 
 
This is a discourse Tong reproduces. Further, in the interview climate change is also 
equivalent with what it is not, which is a force in the future, and rather it is constructed as 
something that is “already with us.” (Appendix 3: 1) This is an articulation of a climate 
change discourse, which is not merely a challenge of the future, but which is already an 
issue. Caney argues, that “(...) climate change will have harmful effects on many human 
beings and, in particular, on the most disadvantaged.” (Caney, 2010: 69) Since, as Tong 
articulates it, Kiribati is already experiencing the effects and consequences of climate 
change, which wealthier nations might not yet have experienced or at least not at the same 
level. Humphreys argues, “the main victims of climate change will not be resident in the 
wealthy polluting countries.” (Humphreys, 2010: 55) This means that the consequences of 
climate change are experienced differently according to one’s geographical position, which 
therefore influences the different ways of giving meaning to the impacts of climate change. 
At several occasions Tong appeals to the international community to take climate change 
seriously. Thus, his position as a politician makes it possible for him to speak to the 
international community within the discourses of climate change. Byravan and Rajan also 
argue that the asymmetrical impacts of climate change are built upon an already unequal 
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relation between the poor and the rich. The burden is mostly placed with the poor who tend 
to be placed geographically in exposed areas of climate change. This is unfair since “(...) the 
poor played only a minor role, if any, in causing the climate problem, and certainly did not 
reap the benefits of economic expansion during the past two centuries or so.” (Byravan & 
Rajan, 2010: 246) Therefore, one reason of the difference in discourses surrounding climate 
change is due to the level of urgency in experiencing consequences. In relation to this, Tong 
articulates how he and the I-Kiribatians are already experiencing consequences:  
 
“I’m seeing evidence of communities which are now having to cope with the loss of 
food crops, the contamination of the water lenses, and I see these communities perhaps 
leaving, having to relocate, within five to 10 years.” (Appendix 3: 2) 
  
Thus, climate change is equivalent with evidence; the evidence that the consequences of 
climate change are experienced in Kiribati at this moment and not merely in the future.  
The consequences of climate change are connected to the moment rising sea levels, 
which is an experienced consequence for Kiribati. Byravan and Rajan also argue what the 
impacts of sea level rise will be on the Pacific Islands. According to them, sea level rises 
leads to flood and storm damage, saltwater intrusion, erosion and wetland loss among else. 
This can lead to a reduction in available land for cultivation and water resources, which will 
cause severe suffering when it comes to livelihood and loss of habitat (Byravan & Rajan, 
2010: 240). According to Tong, these specific devastating impacts are already experienced 
in Kiribati. This evidence of consequences in the interview with Tong places climate change 
equivalent to something that does not happen gradually, but rather equivalent to an urgent 
challenge (Appendix 3: 2). During Tong’s presidential term, the government developed a 
strategy called migration with dignity:  
 
“It would be irresponsible to acknowledge this reality and not do anything to prepare 
our community for eventual migration in circumstances that permit them to migrate with 
dignity.” (Kiribati Climate Change, n.d.)  
 
They perceive migration to be a part of the future of Kiribati, which they would rather 
prepare I-Kiribatians for instead of facing forced mass migration. Here, mass migration is 
equivalent with “(...) what’s happening in Europe.” (Appendix 3: 3), as something he wants 
his nation to avoid, thus reproducing discourses about the current refugee situation in 
Europe. Climate change is equivalent with migrate, since Tong articulates a discourse where 
migration is inevitable, but he wants people to have the option to do so already now, in order 
to avoid forced mass migration in the future. This is where the notion of dignity relates to 
migration. Tong says: “we don’t want something to happen that they are forced to migrate 
without having been prepared to do so.” (Appendix 3: 3). Since he sees migration as an 
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unavoidable consequence of climate change, he wants his people to have the option to do so 
in a manner, which ascribes them agency. With the process of migration with dignity, the 
government of Kiribati is attempting to empower their people. In the articulation of this, 
Tong is showing how they are already working hard at preparing their nation to adapt. This 
can be seen as a strategic attempt to make the rest of the world act upon climate change too. 
He thus articulates a discourse, which constructs migration to be a future prospect of climate 
change. Here the moment collectively is equivalent with the nodal point of climate change: 
 
“It’s an emotional thing [having to migrate], and I’ve tried to live with it, and I know 
that on occasions, I’m accused of not trying to solve the problem because I can’t solve 
the problem. It’s something that’s got to be done collectively.” (Appendix 3: 3)  
  
Migrate, which is in a chain of equivalence with collectively, gives meaning to how Tong 
argues how climate change must be handled, since migration with dignity is a process in 
which Kiribati can not be the only actors in, as it requires other nations to welcome the I-
Kiribatians.  
Tong (re)produces a discourse which consists of moments giving the nodal point of 
climate change meaning. The discourse of climate change is constructed as a real issue, 
which is human induced, and a present challenge since there is evidence of the 
consequences, one of them being a rise in sea levels experienced in Kiribati. Climate change 
is an urgent challenge, which has migration as a future prospect. Therefore, the solution is 
constructed as a collective one due to climate change being a global phenomenon.     
Climate change is a future issue 
Key also draws on a climate change discourse. Thus, climate change is a nodal point 
equivalent to a real issue. This is similar to Tong’s articulation of the discourse, but the 
nodal point is also equivalent to in decades to come or, what we interpret as, the future. 
Climate change is constructed as a future issue in contrast to Tong’s construction as a 
present issue. Here an antagonistic struggle occurs, since the nodal point climate change is 
the same, but two oppositional moments, future and present, are equivalent to the nodal 
point. These are therefore struggling to assign meaning to climate change. This is not a 
struggle, which is only produced in these two texts, but a characteristic of the concept of 
climate change as fluid. As Hastrup & Olwig and Hulme argue: “There are many social and 
scientific meanings attached to climate, and no less to climate change.” (Hastrup & Olwig, 
2012: 2) The debate on climate change and the consequences thereof are thus a result of this 
fluidity.  
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When the nodal point climate change is equivalent with future or in decades to come, 
decades is equivalent with 30-40-50 years. A chain of equivalence is created, which ascribes 
a different meaning to climate change. Climate change is constructed by Key as a real issue 
and a challenge, but only in decades to come in 30-40-50 years, in contrast to Tong’s 
articulation that climate change is here now. Furthermore, the terminology of refugee 
ascribes meaning to the nodal point climate change. Climate change is articulated as a valid 
reason for people seeking asylum, but since climate change is constructed as a future issue, 
and not a present one, seeking asylum because of climate change is not a valid argument in 
that specific situation. Key’s position as Prime Minister of New Zealand is a determining 
factor for the way he argues. Key must present the reasons of Teitiota’s rejection as valid. If 
he does acknowledge climate change to be a contemporary issue with great impacts on 
Kiribati, the reasons to deny Teitiota asylum might be invalid. 
Climate change is constructed as a future challenge with consequences that make their 
homeland uninhabitable, which then would make a good case for relocation. Through this 
chain of equivalence a discourse of climate change as a future issue is articulated again. Key 
says that “(...) some of the scientists are certainly predicting quite a rise in sea levels, and if 
that is the case then it will challenge those low-line states (...).” (Appendix 1: 1) In this way 
the moment predicting is equivalent with the nodal point climate change and when saying 
that some scientists are predicting a rise in sea levels, he is implicitly questioning whether or 
not this is valid. Thus, in presenting climate change as predicted to come in the future, Key 
is once again ascribing validity to his arguments for the legal denial of Teitiota’s asylum. A 
reason that some nation-states, such as New Zealand, question the impacts of climate change 
could lie in the difficulty of establishing facts about the future. Byravan and Rajan write:  
 
“The difficulty in accurate forecasting lies not only in the uncertainty regarding future 
climate change impacts and adaptation measures but also in estimating the outcome of 
the several complex factors driving migration.” (Byravan & Rajan, 2010: 239)  
 
If it were possible to establish an accurate forecast with less controversy about the severe 
impacts of climate change and of the mass migration this may lead to, perhaps it would be 
treated more actively as a threat in our present time than as a threat of the future. But until 
this is completely established, governments can, as the National Party does, await taking 
serious measures against climate change and its impacts. This is controversial, since 
especially the consequences of mass migration will not only impact the people who are 
directly affected by climate change, but also in the countries, which they will migrate to. But 
seeing as there still exists a wide range of controversy in this field, as Hastrup & Olwig and 
Byravan & Rajan suggest, Key is amongst others who reproduce a discourse which doubts 
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whether or not the consequences of climate change will be devastating for some nations, and 
his political position allows him to do so.  
Climate change is articulated as a real issue of the future or in decades (30-40-50 years) 
to come, which thus makes it a non-credible argument for the relocation of people as long as 
their homelands are not uninhabitable. The discourse of climate change as a future issue 
stands in an antagonistic relation to the discourse of climate change as a present issue 
struggling to ascribe meaning to the nodal point climate change. This has severe impacts on 
how solutions, aid and responsibility are viewed in relation to climate change. 
Climate change is a human rights issue 
The two presented conceptions of climate change of either leading to consequences in the 
future or as already present are just two of many contemporary discourses surrounding 
climate change, as of which Hastrup and Olwig define as fluid. This entails a wide range of 
controversy and nuances due to different interests, agendas and political positions. In our 
third case study, the interview with Alofa, yet another nuance of a discourse of climate 
change is constructed. In this text climate change is a nodal point. In Alofa’s articulated 
discourse of climate change human rights stands out in the chain of equivalence, because she 
argues that climate change should become a human rights issue. Humphreys argues that 
although this connection is relatively unexplored, it is self-evident that climate change and 
human rights should be spoken of interrelated (Humphreys, 2010: 37). Alofa contests that 
according to the contemporary human rights law, climate change is already leading to these 
being violated: “it is a human rights issue right now, because it is going to take away 
everything that makes me a I-Kiribatian and a human being.” (Appendix 2: 2) Thus, being a 
human being and an I-Kiribatian is equivalent to her conception of human rights, which she 
says will be taken away from her and other I-Kiribatians as a consequence of climate 
change. She therefore argues that these two are interconnected, but that they are not treated 
as such in climate conferences and in a human rights perspective. Furthermore, Alofa talks 
about her experiences at the climate conferences, saying that: “it was so hard with these 
negotiations and to come up with agreements. Because we haven’t tackled it from a human 
rights perspective.” (Appendix 2: 3) Here climate change becomes equivalent with 
negotiations and with agreements as difficult to reach at, unless her suggestion of 
interconnectedness between climate change and human rights occur. In relation to this, Alofa 
states that the representatives present from developing countries agreed with her suggestion. 
She continues by saying, that: “They [the big countries: developed countries] will recognize 
it, but it will take time because they wanted to go into a process.” (Appendix 2: 3) In this 
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way Alofa discursively reconstructs a binary of developing and developed nations, a binary 
that could be understood in relation to discourses of development. In relation to this, the 
interviewer asks Alofa about her opinion of Australia’s engagement in the issues of climate 
change. Her response to this is extremely critical towards Australia, claiming that they think 
that helping with development aid is enough of an effort to be supportive of climate change. 
She argues that:“(...) climate change is an issue to us, and if we tackle climate change it is 
already a development. So we have to take all our issues on the face of climate change.” 
(Appendix 2: 4) Here development is equivalent with climate change, in the way she 
constructs the two as equals in the future of Kiribati. Further, issue is equivalent with climate 
change, which is similar to Tong’s discourse of climate change, since there is no doubt cast 
upon whether or not climate change is a real issue. Tong argues that climate change is a 
global issue. Alofa does not argue entirely against this, but she does argue that: “the effects 
of climate change in every country is different.” (Appendix 2: 7)  
According to Tong, an unavoidable solution to climate change for I-Kiribatians is 
migration, of which Alofa calls upon help to avoid. She therefore articulates a discourse of 
climate change, which is not equivalent with migration seeing as this is not necessarily the 
solution:  
 
“I do not want to leave Kiribati, it is my home. (...) we need a lot of help. We need 
technology, we need funding for education of that, adaptation, we need our people, 
those deniers to wake up! And even the deniers in the developed countries to wake up, 
that it is happening! (...) we can work in partnership with our development countries in 
partnerships to adaptation, so we can stay on Kiribati.” (Appendix 2: 8) 
 
Several things are interesting in the way Alofa assigns meaning to climate change here. First, 
she implicitly argues that migration can be avoided, since what is needed to stay is help from 
countries such as Australia and partnerships with other development countries. She 
reproduces an already existing development discourse of partnership, whilst representing 
countries through categories of developing and developed. Secondly, by claiming that 
deniers in her own nation and in developed nations need to realize that climate change is 
happening, she discursively constructs climate change as a present matter. It is likely, that 
this discourse is constructed due to Alofa’s position and background in the environmental 
organization KiriCan, since the organization attempts to work with adaptation, sustainable 
development and protection of the global environment. Climate change is therefore 
constructed as a present issue. Alofa is thus positioned between Key and Tong in the 
antagonistic struggle of ascribing meaning to the nodal point of climate change. Alofa’s 
discourse of climate change is not merely a reproduction of Tong’s discourse, since 
migration is not positioned in the chain of equivalence as unavoidable, but as a consequence 
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she aims to avoid. She thus articulates a discourse of climate change as something that can 
be reversed. In accordance with this, Bourban argues how more well off nations must react 
upon climate change:  
 
“We have to make sure that vulnerable populations can adapt to the severe impacts of 
climate change (...). We must compensate the victims of climate change, for instance by 
distributing immigration rights to climate migrants and exiles.” (Bourban, 2014: 44)  
 
In this way, Alofa’s articulation of climate change discourse is alike others, which hold some 
nations more responsible of acting upon climate change and helping those nations, who will 
undergo the worst consequences. In calling for help, Alofa suggests that if climate change 
can be reversed I-Kiribatians will be able to stay in Kiribati and therefore migration will not 
be a necessary solution. She also speaks as a private person, which allows her to make use of 
more radical argumentation. This is in contrast to Tong, whose argumentation shows other 
nations what Kiribati will actively do, where Alofa to a larger extent places the blame on 
well off nations and emphasizes their responsibility to act upon climate change. 
Alofa (re)produces a climate change discourse which is ascribed meaning by human 
rights. Climate change is constructed to be a human rights issue, since it has consequences 
for human beings. Climate change is a negotiating matter, where agreeing is difficult but it is 
also a development issue that is non-universal since it affects countries differently. In this 
construction climate change and the consequences thereof, does not necessarily have to be a 
migration issue because it can be reversed if developed countries are willing to help and if a 
partnership bond is made between development countries.  
To sum up, the antagonistic struggle between the discourses of climate change as a 
present issue and climate change as a future issue demonstrates the fluidity of climate 
change and the different positions within this struggle. The following part of the analysis 
focuses on the theme of national identity of Kiribati. The group identity of Kiribati will 
especially be analyzed using the concept, group formation. The struggle of discourses is an 
indication of the unclear perceptions of climate change, which, as showed, can have social 
consequences for some. So can constructions of identities, representations and positions 
since they too assign meaning to perceptions of climate migration. Constructions of Kiribati 
and national identity will be treated in the following. 
Kiribati - in need of help? 
Alofa discursively constructs Kiribati or in other words, the identity of the I-Kiribatians, 
when she speaks on behalf of Kiribati as a group. As she articulates: 
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“And for instance, to represent the civil society of Kiribati and the pacific, to take the 
voices to the United Nations Human Rights Council (...). Asking the council, to take our 
recommendation, to make sure that climate change becomes a human rights issue.” 
(Appendix 2: 1) 
 
Here she speaks about how she wishes to give the people a voice and present their appeal to 
the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to make climate change a human 
rights issue. Thereby, Kiribati is equivalent to the moment voices that plead climate change 
to become a human rights issue. In this way, she articulates how this is an issue for the 
whole community of Kiribati and not just herself. She refers to the UNHRC and the human 
rights declaration, which are then positioned in a dominant position of power, since they are 
to decide whether climate change should become a human rights issue, thus positioning 
Kiribati as inferior. She articulates how climate change is a big part of the everyday life on 
Kiribati since it is being felt by the entire population (Appendix 2: 2). Multiple times Kiribati 
and I-Kiribatians is equivalent to being in need of help due to climate change. To 
demonstrate this we will reapply the following quote: 
 
“I do not want to leave Kiribati, it is my home. I do not want the young people of 
Kiribati to feel afraid, in their own homes. We just need, we need a lot of help. (...) we 
need our people, those deniers to wake up!” (Appendix 2: 8)  
 
Kiribati is also equivalent to home, and how they should not feel afraid in their own homes. 
Alofa is constructing a discourse relating to their rootedness to Kiribati and further their 
reluctance to leave their home island. This can be related to the role that land plays for the 
pacific islanders as described by Burkett:  
 
“Although the Pacific island region is notably heterogeneous, for the Pacific islander, 
broadly speaking, land is vitally important, and for many cultures it is inseparable from 
those who “belong” to it. The islanders’ “roots” in the land are literal in meaning for the 
cultures in which the word for “land” describes both the soil and the placenta.” (Burkett, 
2013: 103) 
 
Climate change and the loss of land therefore mean a spiritual and cultural loss, for the 
pacific islanders. This interrelationship should be acknowledged in any international 
responses to the consequences of climate change affecting the islands. But at the same time 
it is important to note that both rootedness and migration is part of the pacific culture, in line 
with the following statement by John Campbell: 
 
”(...) the paradoxical notion of both roots and routes” is an important aspect of Pacific 
island lives. This hybridity exists, while people’s sense of belonging and connection to a 
place remains intact, even if they are at quite a physical distance from home.” 
(Campbell in Burkett, 2013: 103) 
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Migration is as stated earlier not new to the Pacific islands, but what should be noted is that 
even when islanders are away from home they still have a strong sense of connection to their 
home-island. But due to the effects of climate change the ability to return to their homes will 
be a possibility deprived from them, which would entail an immense loss of identity because 
of their rootedness in the soil of Kiribati. This could then explain why Alofa articulates a 
discourse of not wanting to leave Kiribati and rejects the menace that I-Kiribatians should 
ever fear staying in their home-island. 
Kiribati is constructed as being aware of climate change, because they stand in 
opposition to the deniers of climate change. The deniers of climate change are articulated 
among others as the developed nations, such as Australia. Alofa directly speaks to the people 
of Australia for help when she states:  
 
“Please lobby to your prime minister, that Kiribati needs help and that the pacific needs 
help, and second is do not invest in this fossil fuel companies, take out all your 
investments and invest in, it is your opportunity today to invest in renewable energies, 
the countries of China and Asia are going into this, and they are going to.. Why can’t 
Australians do this? They can? And you can start using trains, and maybe use your cars 
less. And keep it at home, and use your bicycles, and stay healthy.” (Appendix 2: 8) 
 
Alofa accentuates again how Kiribati is in need of help, by asking the Australians to invest 
in renewable energy instead of fossil fuels and to use bicycles as transportation instead of 
cars. Hence Australia is represented as a nation that pollutes and is equivalent to fossil fuels 
and using cars, and therefore partly responsible for the greenhouse gas emission, thereby 
constructing Kiribati as a place that does not pollute as much. Kiribati is again positioned as 
inferior to Australia because they are reliant on their help and that they need them to lower 
their fossil fuel emission since they are in the vulnerable position. Australia is in a position 
to choose whether they wish to help the people of Kiribati or not. The identity of I-
Kiribatians is equivalent to a population trying to survive when Alofa articulates:  
 
“I want your prime minister to come to Kiribati! At least for one week, during the king 
tide. Let them come, just to see you know. He’s most welcome to come and see. You 
know and enjoy watching the king tide.. and watching our people run around trying to 
escape the waters, and they are trying to survive.” (Appendix 2: 4-5) 
 
Once more Kiribati is signified as a country that is vulnerable and in need of help, a help that 
must come from Australia. It is also worth mentioning in connection to the dimension of 
discursive practice that the interviewer is Australian, which explains why she says: “I want 
your prime minister to come to Kiribati!” (Appendix 2: 4)  Alofa is not just asking the 
Australian government for help, she is also reaching out to the people of Australia.  
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Alofa reproduces a discourse on how it is the big emitters such as Australia that are 
responsible for climate change. Thus, they are also responsible for helping those, like 
Kiribati, who are most vulnerable to climate change.  
A Christian Community 
The Christian belief is another important aspect of how Alofa constructs the I-Kiribatian 
identity:   
 
 “(...) and yes we were created in the image of God.. And we are supposed to be 
stewards for God’s creation, at the same time it says if you destroy the earth, you will be 
destroyed yourselves.. So we have to be stewards, we talk about human rights, but we 
also have responsibility, and that is to look after what God has given us.. And it is a 
blessing that we live in a country like Kiribati, that is a blessing that God has given us. 
Right.. and we have to look after it. It is our responsibility as stewards, as Christians.” 
(Appendix 2: 7) 
 
I-Kiribatians is equivalent to created in the image of god and stewards of god’s creation, 
which is also equivalent to what god has given or in other words the Kiribatian nation or the 
Earth, again referring to their rootedness. Thereby she articulates the importance of taking 
care of the environment and not emitting greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. This also 
refers back to her wish to stay in Kiribati and not having to migrate because of the effects of 
climate change. She articulates how the majority of the Kiribatian nation is Christian:  
 
“I could say that 99.9 percent of Kiribati is Christian, and supported by the church, and 
if we have to deal with people of Kiribati, and our government have to deal with people, 
and communities, you know, they will have to reach them.. they have to go through the 
churches, they have a very strong hold in our community, in our culture.” (Appendix 2: 
6) 
 
Christianity, our culture, a very strong hold in our community and church are all equivalent 
to Kiribati. They are articulated as being in a position of power since in order to reach people 
on Kiribati they have to go through the churches. The church is also equivalent to basis of 
belief when Alofa states how it is embodied in their culture and knowledge and as values, 
which they carry and identify with (Appendix 2: 7). The signifiers of Kiribati and Church 
communities are very closely intertwined and give meaning to each other in the discourse 
articulated by Alofa. This also affects the Christian I-Kiribatian view of climate change.  
Alofa is interviewed on a radio program with a focus on issues such as religion, ethics, 
spirituality, values and social issues. She is a representative of KiriCan, which is in a 
partnership with church agencies and she is thus also a representative of the church. This 
explains why she focuses on the role of the church in Kiribati in relation to climate change. 
The discursive construction of I-Kiribatian as a Christian people with strong church 
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communities relates to the findings by Kempf. He concludes how the Pacific churches have 
a profound influence on regional perceptions of the environment, climate change, and 
migration. Thus, any considerations of social and political responses to climate change, sea 
level rises, and (forced) migration in the region cannot succeed without consulting and 
taking into account the importance that Christianity currently has in the region (Kempf, 
2012: 253). In line with the articulations of Alofa, Kempf states how the majority of the 
population of Kiribati is Christian: 
 
“The two largest churches in Kiribati (and this by a considerable margin) are the Roman 
Catholic Church, with a membership of 55 per cent of the population, and the Kiribati 
Protestant Church, with 36 per cent; between them they represent the overwhelming 
majority of the I-Kiribati.” (Kempf, 2012: 253)  
  
He describes how besides from participating: “(...) in the political decision-making process 
over needed adaptive strategies and measures in the face of climate change” (Kempf, 2012: 
248) the Christian churches in Kiribati have also had an impact on the people’s awareness on 
climate change, environmental protection, and adaptation through campaign work (Kempf, 
2012: 248). As he states: 
 
“(...) I would propose, a working hypothesis, that church institutions and their social 
actors in the Pacific are, at the present moment in time, mobilizing Christian values and 
understandings (...) to contain conflicts stemming from climate change and migration.” 
(Kempf, 2012: 254)   
 
But Kempf emphasizes how even though the church has done a lot when it comes to 
adaptive strategies and informing the nations about the issue of climate change and 
migration, thus containing possible conflicts, the church still treats these issues as something 
in a distant future. Kempf suggests that when the issues of climate change and migration 
become more urgent, the dominant voice of the Christian institutions on climate policy will 
hopefully have an influence on the life of the I-Kiribatians (Kempf, 2012: 250). Therefore, it 
can be argued that the church is in a position of power in relation to policies on adaptation to 
climate change in Kiribati. This position may, as Kempf argues, be altered over time. So 
even though the Christian institution plays a significant part in containing conflicts at 
present, there might be new conflicts or resistance in the future. In order to predict possible 
outcomes as researchers it is necessary, according to Kempf, to: “(...) pick up on the entire 
spectrum of possible effects emanating from religion qua political practice in today’s context 
of climate change and mobility.” (Kempf, 2012: 254)  
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The I-Kiribatian perception of migration 
Similar to the way that Alofa represents Kiribati, Tong represents the people of Kiribati in 
his interview for instance when he articulates: 
 
“But, as a country, we have made a commitment that no matter what happens, we will 
try as much as possible to stay and continue to exist as a nation. What that will take, it's 
going to be something quite significant, very, very substantial. Either we live on floating 
islands, or we have to build up the islands to continue to stay out of the water as the sea 
level rises and as the storms get more severe. But even that, it's going to be very, very 
difficult to get the kind of resourcing that we would need.” (Appendix 3: 2) 
 
It is important to note that when he represents Kiribati he does so in relation to the issues of 
climate change and migration, and Kiribati is therefore given meaning through a discourse 
on climate change and migration. Tong represents Kiribati as a nation that will try as much 
as possible to stay and continue to exist as a nation. Thus, he implies how Kiribati is a 
threatened nation due to climate change whilst also signifying the people of Kiribati as a 
population that will fight for their existence. The reason for this construction of Kiribati may 
also be an expression of how Tong is appealing to other nations for help, as when he 
emphasizes the resourcing that they would need for their projects. Tong also accentuates 
how other bigger nations need to act and cut their greenhouse gas emissions, in order for the 
I-Kiribatian people to survive. Again Kiribati is represented as threatened, when he states: 
“(…) if you do not cut your emissions, then our survival is on the line.” (Appendix 3: 9) 
Here he constructs how the Kiribatian people has their survival on the line articulating how 
they are in a vulnerable position in opposition to the developed nations. When asked by the 
interviewer if the only recourse is some form of forced migration, Tong articulates how the 
people of Kiribati do not wish to mass migrate. Migrate is equivalent with choice and option 
to decide when to migrate instead of being equivalent with forced to migrate. Migrate is also 
equivalent with adjustments since if they do migrate it will take a whole lot of adjustments. 
This also relates back to the group identity of Kiribati, where migration entails adjustments 
and thereby a loss of identity. He also articulates how migration is something they generally 
do not wish to do: 
 
“This is our wish. Nobody wants ever to leave their home, and so it’s been a very 
difficult decision for me. As a leader, you don’t make plans to leave your island, your 
home, and so I’ve been asked on a number of occasions, “So how do you feel?” And it 
doesn’t feel good at all.” (Appendix 3: 4) 
 
Generally, migration is equivalent to something the people of Kiribati do not wish to do and 
it is also equivalent to a difficult decision. Migration is also a nodal point in itself where to 
leave home, is equivalent to migration, which is also equivalent to how it doesn’t feel good 
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and is in general articulated by Tong as something problematic. Tong mentions how Kiribati 
has people who already have been dislocated: 
 
“We have a community of Kiribati people living in that part of the Solomon Islands, but 
these were people who were relocated from the Phoenix Islands, in fact, in the 1960s. 
There was serious drought, and the people could not continue to live on the island, and 
so they were moved to live here in the Solomon Islands. (...) I spoke in our language, 
and of course, they spoke back, they replied, but their accent, they are beginning not to 
be able to speak Kiribati properly. I saw them, there was this lady with red teeth. She 
was chewing betel nuts, and it’s not something we do in Kiribati. We don’t chew betel 
nuts.” (Appendix 3: 4) 
 
Tong articulates how the people who have been relocated are different from the I-
Kiribatians, by for instance chewing betel nuts and speaking with an accent, thereby also 
articulating the loss of identity related to migration. Migration is a part of the I-Kiribatian 
history since people from Kiribati have already moved to the Solomon Islands due to 
environmental issues in the 1960s. Tong draws on the history of Kiribati, which he then 
relates to contemporary issues of migration as an illustration of what might happen if the I-
Kiribatians are forced to migrate. 
   Barnett discusses the discourse on migration due to climate change or more precisely: 
“large-scale migration as a solution to save the people of the Pacific Islands from the 
impacts of climate change.” (Barnett, 2012: 169) He criticizes how there is little concern for 
the needs and rights of migrants in these discourses. There is also no consideration for the 
consequences for the people who cannot and do not wish to migrate (Barnett, 2012: 169). He 
suggests how migration will likely be an effect of climate change while it will also be a 
question of adaptation for the affected communities. Barnett states how small island nations 
have become an icon for international policy issues and climate change, but generally, that it 
is people who do not live in the pacific islands who are preoccupied with these issues. 
According to Barnett, the downside of the immense focus on the Pacific Islands, has led 
many nations, for instance Australia, to think that Pacific Islanders have no other option than 
to flee. The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics are in favor of 
relocating the people instead of reducing greenhouse gas emissions because it will be more 
financially beneficial (Barnett, 2012: 172). The issue that Barnett points out is that in any 
given scenario of migration or resettlement, there will be people who will wish to stay. This 
is the goal for Alofa, who believes that migration should be the last resort. Barnett states 
that: “If human rights are respected, the rights of those who want to stay should be 
honoured.” (Barnett, 2012: 177) Barnett’s main argument is that relocating people on a large 
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scale from small island states will not reduce vulnerability. He points to the example of the 
island Niue: 
 
“(...) there may be a threshold beyond which the benefits of reducing exposure to 
climate risks by reducing population begin to be offset by reductions in the capacity of 
those who remain to adapt. At the extreme end of this process of depopulation, as in the 
case of Niue, vulnerability may be quite high because the capacity to adapt is so 
constrained by the smallness of the population.” (Barnett, 2012: 186) 
  
If a large part of the population moves away, the remaining people will not have the capacity 
at all to adapt to climate change, since the capacity to adaptations requires a number of 
resources such as financial resources, governance, social resources, infrastructure, and 
technology (Barnett, 2012: 185). Barnett argues that mitigation and adaptation are the 
preferred strategies, but they will have to be performed through careful management of labor 
migration as part of the adaptation strategies (Barnett, 2012: 169). This can also be related to 
Kiribati, when considering how they should adapt to climate change and whether large-scale 
migration is a solution. Barnett mentions how Kiribati is one of the few nations that has 
raised concerns for the large-scale resettlement of islands:  
 
“Rarely are discourses concerning the wholesale resettlement of islands made by or 
accepted by people in the Pacific Islands, with the notable exception being the 
ephemeral tactic of Tuvalu and Kiribati to highlight the risk of migration away from 
their countries due to climate change.” (Barnett, 2012: 172) 
 
Therefore, we argue for the importance of being aware of the many consequences related to 
large-scale migration, instead of only promoting it as a solution for small island nations as is 
the case with for instance Australia and New Zealand.  
The I-Kiribatians are discursively constructed in relation to the rootedness to their 
Kiribatian territory, which explains the fear for loss of identity, if forced to migrate. 
Furthermore, the Christian belief is constructed as a big part of the I-Kiribatian self-
understanding. The Christian Institution therefore also plays a significant role in how they 
adapt to climate change. On this note, we round this theme off and move on to the theme: 
Responsibility. When analyzing constructions of national identity and its impact on 
discourses on climate migration, it is as important to analyze how constructions of categories 
and positions play a significant part. This also raises questions of responsibility, which 
constitutes our third and final theme. 
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The power of discursive legitimacy 
In the following, we will examine the discourses articulated by Key. In the interview with 
Key, the first international example of a climate refugee, Teitiota, is constructed as an 
overstayer and not a refugee: “In my eyes he is not a refugee, he’s an overstayer.” 
(Appendix 1: 1) Thus, we perceive overstayer as a nodal point, which will be the center of 
attention in the following analysis in order to bring forth the discourse of terminology and 
the power relations within. 
Key articulates how the pacific nations are the neighbors of New Zealand. This is 
interesting because it constructs not only a geographically related position but also denotes a 
close relation between New Zealand and the low-line pacific islands:  
 
“(...) and in the end what I’ve always said about climate change when it comes to our 
low-line pacific neighbors, is that we, you know as New Zealanders, I think are very 
compassionate people and if in decades to come a real issue presents itself and I think 
that New Zealanders will take that compassionate view.” (Appendix 1: 1) 
 
The moment neighbors makes New Zealand and the pacific low-lying nations seem close, 
but at the same time since Teitiota is constructed as an overstayer he still has to return to 
Kiribati. Furthermore, a refugee is constructed as something Teitiota could become in the 
future, but for now, he must live with the category of being an overstayer. We argue that 
Key reproduces a political discourse of illegal immigrants. He chooses the terminology 
overstayer, which is a euphemism, instead of using the category illegal immigrant, which is 
what overstayer actually accounts for. He reproduces an already existing discourse and a low 
level of interdiscursivity is displayed. The discourse of overstayer implicates the diffusion of 
and the power relations relating to the terminology of a person displaced. Morrissey names 
the debate regarding terminology for displaced persons: “a battle for discursive legitimacy.” 
(Morrissey in Hastrup & Olwig, 2012: 110) Due to the rejection of Teitiota, we argue that 
Key, through the discourse of overstayer, represents an example of someone who tries to 
gain discursive legitimacy, as the legal framework has already categorized him as illegal. 
Key does not win the battle of discursive legitimacy. Rather, he attempts to gain this 
legitimacy through the specific use of vocabulary. If Key is in a powerful position, why does 
he not categorize Teitiota as an illegal immigrant and as unwanted in New Zealand? We 
argue, that this shows a limitation of Key’s own power. His articulations of Teitiota’s case 
and the euphemism are created consciously to be in coherence with his own political image. 
The construction of the euphemism also adheres to the sentiment, that New Zealand must 
appear as compassionate on an international level. The euphemism facilitates his attempt to 
gain discursive legitimacy; at the same time it displays the limitation of his power. Key 
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constructs the notion of an overstayer as someone who does not follow the rules and fit into 
the system or a legal framework. The following moments rules, system and case exemplifies 
why Key constructs him as an overstayer, as he is unable to put up a case that is righteous 
and can protect him.  
 
“But some of the that have overstayed in New Zealand I don’t think can credibly put up 
a case as we have a set of rules that say... You have to stick to those rules otherwise, 
well, basically the wheels fall of because everyone goes around the system.” (Appendix 
1: 1) 
  
Key provides the rules and system of New Zealand as an explanation for the outcome of 
Teitiota’s case, but also as arguments for the discourse that he reproduces and the discursive 
legitimacy he tries to gain through this discourse. This also relates to the political figure Key 
is trying to appear as, and through that he pursues to create or maintain the image of 
representing a compassionate nation.  
Now we move on to another pressing issue - the consequences of positions of power. 
Solomon & Warner states that the first tragedy of categorization is that there is no legally 
binding agreement collectively agreed upon for a person displaced caused by climate change 
or environmental factors: 
 
“No international legal instrument specifically and explicitly defines environmental 
migration or environmental migrants (or climate migration/migrants or refugees), 
includes provision for cross-border movements induced by the environment, or provides 
for the protection of persons who move due to environmental factors. Neither the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) nor its Kyoto Protocol includes 
any provisions concerning specific protection of or assistance to those who will be 
directly displaced by climate change.” (Solomon & Warner, 2013: 246) 
 
In this way Teitiota does not fit into the legal framework and the category of refugee that 
could assure to protect him. This means that the government of New Zealand is not required 
to be responsible and provide for him. As Solomon and Warner also argue: 
 
“With a regrettably pervasive xenophobic atmosphere in many countries around the 
world today, where refugees are often subjected to discriminatory treatment and unfairly 
blamed as an economic burden or source of criminality, efforts to expand the 
understanding or scope of the definition of refugees cannot be undertaken lightly.” 
(Solomon & Warner, 2013: 258) 
  
Hence, it could be discussed how the categories available would not ensure the rights and 
needs of people displaced, seeing how nation-states in contemporary society are reluctant to 
take in refugees and migrants. In relation to this, it is interesting how it most likely is not the 
developed nations, who are in danger of having to migrate, who enforce legal frameworks 
and construct categories of migrants and refugees. This points to how the developed nations 
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are capable of creating frameworks that protect their own national interests, but not 
frameworks that manage to comprehend the needs of developing nations. 
Key reproduces a discourse of Teitiota as illegal immigrant.  The reproduction of this 
discourse brings the next pressing issue to mind that even if Teitiota were to be included in 
the terminology refugee, the legal framework would still be problematic and insufficient.   
Protecting your pacific neighbors?  
In the following we will examine Tong’s representation and discursive construction of the 
nodal point international community:  
 
“Well, we are also looking at that because in the event that nothing comes forward from 
the international community, we are preparing, we don’t want to be caught like what’s 
happening in Europe.” (Appendix 3: 3) 
 
The nodal point is ascribed meaning through the way that Tong constructs this international 
community in relation to what it is not, hence Kiribati. This binary entails the international 
as the global and Kiribati as the local. By examining the way Tong ascribes meaning to 
when talking about the international community we gain insight to who is included in this 
community and who is not. We also gain access to what it then means to be either in- or 
excluded, mostly in relation to Kiribati and the challenges they face caused by climate 
change. Alongside the international community and his own community, Tong discursively 
constructs the two opposing representations: people who do care, are also the people who do 
understand:  
 
“Well, let me first begin by saying how deeply grateful I am for this opportunity to 
share my story with people who do care. I think I've been sharing my story with a lot of 
people who don’t care too much.” (Appendix 3:1)  
 
Opposed to the people who do not care and who do not understand: 
 
“They have no concept of what it is that's involved. With the rising sea, they say, “Well, 
you can move back.” And so this is what I tell them. If we move back, we will fall off 
on the other side of the ocean. OK? But these are the kinds of issues that people don't 
understand.” (Appendix 3: 1) 
 
Due to the context of climate change, agency and responsibility, the people who don’t care 
and who don’t understand is also equivalent to the nodal point international community. The 
international community is then constructed as the people who don’t understand climate 
change, because they portray it as an issue to come in the future. Whereas the people who do 
understand and do care represents the people who might experience the consequences of 
climate change as of right now, e.g. the people of Kiribati. We argue that these opposing 
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representations discursively constructed by Tong derive from unequal power relations. 
Kiribati is excluded from the international community, due to the construction of the 
international community as those who do not understand or manage to comprehend the 
impacts of climate change within Kiribati. As he states in the following articulation: “Well, 
we’re at the very bottom end of the spectrum. It’s already with us.” (Appendix 3:1) The 
opposing representations of the people who do understand and people who do not 
understand displays different implications for livelihoods and the future due to climate 
change. Yet, it reminds us how Tong is consciously trying to gain attention at an 
international level. This points to the implications of unequal power relations between the 
global north and global south, as the impacts of climate change have affected the global 
south to a larger extent: 
 
“(...) and so the focus fell heavily on the global south where population growth were 
highest, where farming practices were thought to be inappropriate, and where 
vulnerability to climate change was greatest.” (Hastrup & Olwig, 2012: 112) 
 
Furthermore, Tong articulates how this is not a problem that he can solve, rather it has to be 
solved collectively (Appendix 3: 3). Collectively ascribes meaning to international 
community. Tong constructs a discourse of how the consequences of climate change have to 
be comprehended in collaboration between nation-states. One could ask, as Singer does:  
 
“To what extent should political leaders see their role narrowly, in terms of promoting 
the interest of their citizens, and to what extent should they be concerned with the 
welfare of people everywhere?” (Singer, 2004: 3) 
 
As Singer’s question indicates, there is a challenge of trying to get nation-state leaders to 
partake in the responsibility of the common good on a global scale when they all have 
different interests and agendas. The representation of the international community 
constructed by Tong points to his overall discourse that the international community has 
failed to comprehend climate change and the impacts. Despite this, he still points to a 
collective responsibility when addressing the consequences of climate change. The 
complexities arise because the international community consists of nation-state leaders. The 
failure of the international community is also the failure of the states and their decision-
makers to own up to their responsibility, which can be pointed out in the following by 
Stoutenburg: 
 
“Thus, it could be argued that States, since 1990, have not undertaken proportionate 
measures to protect other States and the global commons against the consequences of 
climate change are in breach of their obligations under the no-harm rule.” (Stoutenburg, 
2013: 82) 
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This argument is in alignment to Tong’s discourse that climate change can not be solved 
individually as a nation or by a president. He thus places responsibility nationally, regionally 
and internationally. Given that Tong suggests that climate change is a problem that should 
be dealt with collectively, and not nationally, the moment nation problem is equivalent to the 
nodal point, as he expresses how the international community fails in their approach: 
 
“And so it’s about them that we should be telling everybody, that it’s not about their 
own national interest, because climate change, regrettably, unfortunately, is viewed by 
many countries as a national problem. It’s not.” (Appendix 3: 6)  
 
Tong constructs opposites in his articulations, where he portrays the many paradoxes within 
responsibility. He states how consequences of climate change should be a global issue, dealt 
with by an international community. In that relation the international community is also 
constructed as a myth, which entails a common sense or naturalized way of perceiving the 
social world. In the discourse of how the international community has failed, the level of 
interdiscursivity is low, seeing that a discourse and myth is already established. Tong also 
creates a discourse of collective responsibility by stating that it is the duty of the 
international community to approach climate change as a global issue, in which an 
alternative discourse is produced. In this a higher level of interdiscursivity is present, since 
Tong is trying to speak to the international community and change the structure of it. This 
also exemplifies his position as a politician. He stands between representing his people and 
preserving the possibility of collaborating with the developed nations. Therefore he has to be 
careful when he criticizes the developed countries, but more importantly how he portrays 
Kiribati, as worth investing in and working with, rather than aiding and helping them, as if 
they were victims. Alofa’s position does not contain the same caution as Tong’s towards the 
international community in her portrayal of Kiribati as victims. Thus her position of national 
coordinator of the KiriCan stands in contrast to the position of Tong, due to her overall 
interest, which is the wellbeing of the I-Kiribatians at any price. This is why she advocates 
for help and risk-reduction-strategies.  
Similar to the way Stoutenburg outlines how states have failed in encountering the 
challenges of climate change, Singer elaborates on the notion of global community as a 
myth. Citizens tend to trust their nation-state leaders rather than a global community: 
 
“Our problems are now too intertwined to be well resolved in a system consisting of 
nation-states, in which citizens give their primary, and near-exclusive, loyalty to their 
own nation-state rather than to the larger global community, and such a system has not 
led to a great enough will to meet the pressing needs of those living in extreme 
poverty.” (Singer, 2004: 171) 
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A part of Tong’s discourse on the failed international community entails the notion that 
climate change is often dealt with and approached as a national problem. As Singer points 
to, the nation leaders are the ones supposedly dealing with these issues rather than a global 
community. Through this discourse, and when reviewed with theoretical perspectives, the 
international community is nothing more than nation-state leaders making decisions 
according to their national interests. 
Calling out Australia 
Alofa also articulates the responsibility of the international community, but more specifically 
she points directly to Australia, which she does not perceive as supportive enough: “I don’t 
really know. Australia at this time, I feel it has taken another step away from us, like we 
know they are not really supportive of climate change.” (Appendix 2: 3). According to 
Alofa, Australia does not own up to the responsibility that she believes Australia should 
partake. This way Australia as not really supportive is equivalent to the nodal point of 
international community, yet with a quite different discursive practice in use. Therefore, 
Australia is equivalent to the international community, as an example of one of the 
developed nation-states with a position in the decision-making body within the imagined 
international community. Alofa articulates a different discourse about the international 
community than Tong, though it is still an existing discourse that speaks into the way that 
the international community is perceived as failing. Stoutenburg problematizes a similar 
issue of a common failure of several states: 
 
“The refusal by many States to commit to scientifically necessary emission reductions 
can certainly be seen as a systematic denial of the need to address climate change in a 
meaningful manner.” (Stoutenburg, 2013: 85) 
 
This could exemplify how Australia has failed to participate in taking action, which Alofa 
points out, as she directly calls out the government of Australia: “But my question is: when 
is the government, this oppressing government to take action? To say: yes it’s real, and this 
is what we need to do.” (Appendix 2: 3) which is what her non-governmental position 
allows her to do. Through this articulation, recognition, which should lead to action from the 
international community, is characteristic in the discourse by Alofa. Thus, Australia 
functions as an example of how the international community has failed Kiribati by not 
recognizing the pressing issues of climate change. Alofa directly links deniers with 
developed countries, which make up the international community. In alignment with this 
discourse, Singer states that there is a need for people in the developed nations to 
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acknowledge the fact that their way of livelihood has consequences for people such as the I-
Kiribatians:  
 
“When people in rich nations switch to vehicles that use more fuel than the cars they 
used to drive, they contribute to changes in the climate of Mozambique or Bangladesh - 
changes that may cause crops to fail, sea levels to rise, and tropical diseases to spread.” 
(Singer, 2004: 1) 
 
Alofa calls for similar action taking in Australia, which she sees as urgent in the matter of 
Kiribati’s future and their possibility to adapt and stay in Kiribati. This leaves us with 
unanswered but problematized notions of responsibility. As mentioned earlier, there is a 
complexity as there is no legal instrument to ensure and uphold this responsibility that both 
Tong and Alofa ask for. The issue is: 
 
“Because of the laxity of the existing standards, the gross and systematic failure to 
address the climate change problem does not translate into a gross and systematic 
violation of international legal obligations.” (Stoutenburg, 2013: 85) 
 
Although, as suggested in the analysis of terminology and existing legal frameworks, even if 
the terminology were to include displaced persons due to climate change, there would still 
be a problem. Even though Tong pursues to create a common ground for action and 
responsibility the question remains: how will Kiribati continue to exist when dealing with 
myths of responsibilities? 
Earth democracy in a globalizing world 
The next section is concerned with industries as being part of environmental factors, which 
have contributed and still contribute to climate change and to the fatal impacts it has on 
Kiribati. We perceive the next nodal point, industries, as important because by highlighting 
the articulated discourse on industries we can get an insight into the way that Tong ascribes 
meaning to it. In this way we gain access to his articulations of industries in relation to the 
international community and responsibility:  
 
“I was in a meeting with the Pacific Island Forum countries where Australia and New 
Zealand are also members, and we had an argument. There was a bit of a story in the 
news because they were arguing that to cut emissions, it would be something that 
they’re unable to do because it would affect the industries.” (Appendix 3: 3)  
 
Tong discursively constructs industries as in opposition to the survival of a population, 
meaning that both cannot thrive due to the environmental circumstances. Shiva addresses 
climate change issues as a responsibility of the companies. Hence, it is argued that the 
companies or industries ruined a supposed balance in the nature in the first place: 
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“In Earth Democracy the responsibility of resolving the climate change problems would 
be on the companies – and their CEO’s. The responsibility of governments and 
intergovernmental agreements would be to ensure that production and consumption 
patterns operate within sustainable cycles.” (Shiva, 2005: 66) 
 
The first moment, which is equivalent to industries, is fish: “We don't have a lot of livestock, 
so it's fish that we depend on” (Appendix 3: 4), due to the construction of industries as 
commercial fishers, which contributes to the damaging and unsustainable way of mass 
fisheries. This builds further upon the discourse of industries opposed to the survival of a 
population. Further the exploitation of natural resources and the greenhouse gas emissions 
by developed countries are affecting the livelihoods of people in developing countries. In an 
analysis by Werksman, it is tested whether or not a small state could sue a big emitter. Given 
that it is an existing discourse that industries from different states have a responsibility 
towards the states affected by climate change. Werksman describes the issue in his analysis: 
 
“This analysis therefore focuses on the remaining challenges of providing a convincing 
legal theory that can hold a “source State” responsible for the consequent damages to 
the “impact State” and of identifying a forum with the jurisdiction and the authority to 
recognize and enforce that responsibility.” (Werksman, 2013: 412) 
 
This is not opposing to Tong’s discourse about the international community. The difference 
is that Tong articulates responsibility, which should build upon a strategy of collaboration 
amongst the international community, including Kiribati and his own participation. Dwelling 
on the possibility for a small nation-state such as Kiribati to sue a big emitter, Singer 
elaborates on this and argues:  
  
“... if Norway can force Britain to pay for the damage its leaking nuclear plants causes 
to their coastline, will not nations like Kiribati be able to sue America for allowing large 
quantities of carbon dioxide to be emitted into the atmosphere, causing rising sea levels 
to submerge their island homes? Although the link between rising sea levels and a 
nation’s emissions of greenhouse gases is much more difficult to prove than the link 
between Britain’s nuclear power plant and technetium-99 found along the norwegian 
coast, it is hard to draw a clear line of principle between the two cases (...).” (Singer, 
2004: 20)  
  
This example brings forth the complex issues within climate change and the power relations 
in a globalized world. The difficulties of placing and proclaiming responsibility when being 
a small nation relates to the distribution of power. What strikes is the illegitimacy of Kiribati 
as a nation-state able to demand America to own up to their responsibility and to make sure 
that they are legally bound to such an agreement. This relates to the battle of discursive 
legitimacy, which is constant and characteristic throughout this analysis. This calls for the 
urgency of international action beyond national interests, as Tong also articulates, since 
Kiribati has no significant power within a larger international community.  
 48 
The moment sacrifice ascribes meaning to industries, as sacrifice is needed when trying 
to comprehend climate change and cut down the high level of greenhouse gas emissions: 
 
“Another reason why I did that was because I had been asking the international 
community that in order to deal with climate change, in order to fight climate change, 
there has got to be sacrifice, there has got to be commitment. So in asking the 
international community to make a sacrifice, I thought we ourselves need to make that 
sacrifice (…) ” (Appendix: 3: 4)  
 
According to Tong, sacrifices are unavoidable within the industrial sector. Shiva constitutes 
the notion of collective responsibility from the companies and not only a local population: 
“Controlling the populations without controlling production and consumption patterns does 
not address the environmental crisis” (Shiva, 2005: 58). This is part of the complexities of 
living in a globalizing world and of the fallacies relating to responsibility and the unequal 
distribution of power, in a world that has been socially constructed around nation-states and 
national interests. In relation to this, the moment commercial fishing ascribes meaning to the 
actions of the industries as something negative: “And forgoing commercial fishing in the 
Phoenix Islands protected area would mean a loss of revenue.” (Appendix 3: 4) Following 
the previous discourse of comprehending climate change collectively, participation is 
equivalent to industries in the sense that it should be on a collective scale that the terms for 
the industry are constructed. Following Tong, Kiribati should participate in the processes of 
arranging the implications for how the industries should and can change:  
 
“What we have been trying to do over the years is actually to increase our participation 
in the industry, in the harvesting, in the processing, and eventually, hopefully, the 
marketing.” (Appendix 3: 5)  
 
He thereby creates a representation of industries, as a unit that could, but more importantly 
should, change. 
Tong articulates artisanal fishery as I-Kiribatian, thus local, which is equivalent to 
industries through what it is not: “For the artisanal fishery, we do not participate in the 
commercial fishing activity except only to supply the domestic market.” (Appendix 3: 5) The 
notion of domestic is also interesting, as it points to commercial fishing being legit if it is for 
the population for whom fish is their livelihood, thus also equivalent to industries by 
pointing out what it is not. As Shiva argues:  
 
“The largest pressure on resources does not come from the large numbers of the poor, 
but from the wasteful production systems, long distance trade, and overconsumption by 
the First World.” (Shiva, 2005: 58) 
 
The overall discourse brings to mind the collective responsibility, as noted by Tong, to 
restructure the industries, yet with a distinct critique of the mass fishing of industries, the 
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greenhouse gas emissions of the developed nations, which primarily affects the livelihoods 
of developing nations. To sum up, the discourses of the failed international community, the 
significance of categorizations and the battle for discursive legitimacy all relate to the 
unequal distribution of power. These are all troubling factors when being in the midst of 
rising sea levels and disappearing islands-nations.   
Discussion and Assessment 
The analysis outlines different discursive constructions of climate migration but it is to be 
discussed the challenges and implications of the different constructions in relation to power 
relations, national identity and responsibility.   
The fluid notion of climate change  
There are innumerable discursive constructions of climate change. Perhaps this has been due 
to the insecurity and lack of scientific proof that climate change is human induced and will 
actually have devastating impacts. Proof of this has eventually found its way, but is yet to be 
acknowledged by all. As we argue in the analysis, there is an antagonistic struggle 
surrounding the nodal point climate change and hegemony has not been reached in a 
momentary fixation of meaning. Therefore, we perceive climate change as fluid, which has 
immense impacts on the debates of climate change. These debates are not innocent since the 
way that climate change is understood and talked about discursively leads to social 
consequences for the people it affects.  
We argue that whether climate change is solely treated as an issue of the future or as 
contemporary has consequences for the people affected. Therefore, the decisions made in 
relation to these understandings will affect people in different geographical and social 
positions in distinctive ways. If climate change is discursively constructed as a future issue, 
then solutions are arguably articulated in relation to preventing climate change from 
becoming worse. This can be said about campaigns such as Earth Hour by the World 
Wildlife Foundation, which asks people to turn off the lights to take precautionary measures 
against global warming. A campaign like this constructs climate change to be a future issue, 
which can be prevented if measures such as using less electricity will be taken. Whereas, if 
climate change is treated as a present issue, perhaps more solution oriented measures to act 
upon climate change are constructed.  
Different contexts constitute our views on and understandings of the world. In this way, 
if our geographical and social position leads to an understanding of whether climate change 
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is problematic or yet to become so, then it is likely that our actions will be in accordance 
with this. Therefore, contexts are highly influential on the fluidity of climate change. These 
conceptions thus lead to common sense understandings of climate change, which differ 
greatly. One reason that some people believe climate change to be a future issue is perhaps 
that their geographical location is yet to experience the consequences of climate change to 
the same extent as others. Thus, viewing it to be less of a challenge than those facing the 
worst consequences as of right now. Nevertheless, if migration is to be seen as a solution to 
the consequences of climate change, it must also be acknowledged to be so - both by people 
in nations facing migration and by people in the receiving countries. Migration as a solution 
is a complex issue, which should not be simplified. This issue will be elaborated and also 
nuanced later in the discussion. The process of migration with dignity implies the possibility 
to migrate by choice before the consequences of climate change become devastating. To 
make this process possible, we find it essential that the nations receiving migrants must 
acknowledge and act upon climate change to be a contemporary issue and not a future one. 
This is where it becomes a matter of unequal power relations: As already established in this 
study, the nations who are facing the worst consequences of climate change presently are the 
nations with less resources, who are also most likely the nations who have emitted less 
greenhouse gases. These nations, such as Kiribati, are the ones with people having to 
migrate to countries who are yet to face the worst consequences of climate change and who 
therefore do not yet acknowledge climate migration. These receiving nations are therefore in 
a dominant position; they are the ones with the most resources and the power to deny 
displaced people access, thus upholding the unequal power relations between them and the 
inferior nations.  
The outline of this process of power relations connected to climate migration above is a 
rather abstract example of how the different discourses surrounding climate change have 
social consequences. These power relations are upheld due to conflicting interests. An 
imbalance between industrial development and its impact on the environment keeps the 
dominating voices in their dominant positions and the less dominant in inferior positions. 
These unequal relations of power lead to a lack of possible action for those inferior. If the 
plan of migration with dignity is to work, the people of Kiribati will have an actual choice of 
leaving the nation and entering a different one. This could grant I-Kiribatians more agency, 
since the choice to migrate would be their own and not forced. Meanwhile, they would also 
be welcomed in the receiving country rather than perceived as a burden, which shows in 
contemporary discourses of the refugee situation in Europe. Furthermore, the most 
dominating voices in the debates of climate change at the moment are the developed nations. 
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This is thus the reason, as proposed in this study, that climate change perceived as a future 
issue is more dominant than climate change as a present issue. Being the less dominant voice 
upholds one in a position where opportunity to have agency and being able to act upon it is 
limited. If no one is listening, how are the people most affected by climate change then 
supposed to act upon their own situation, when a prerequisite is that the world must work 
together? Seen in the light of this global inequality it seems almost unmanageable for the 
world to accommodate climate change when the conceptions of climate change vary 
extensively depending on one’s geographical and social positioning.  
Climate change: A human rights issue or an issue for the 
International Human Rights Law?  
The discursive construction which articulates climate change as a human rights issue is, as 
argued in the analysis, an easy conclusion to end at. This is because, as Bourban argues, 
“climate change is likely to affect the health status of millions of people in the near future 
(...)” (Bourban, 2014: 40) Alofa concludes, that climate change is not yet treated as a human 
rights issue which then reveals some challenges. Even though climate change is a human 
rights issue, climate change also threatens the International Human Rights Law (IHRL) by 
revealing its insufficiency. The IHRL is proved inadequate because of issues with 
establishing responsibility and accountability, conflicting rights, and inequality of categories. 
This will be discussed in the following. 
When human rights have been violated, someone needs to be held accountable for the 
violation. But having someone held accountable for climate change and the consequences of 
it is difficult to the point where you question if it can actually be done. This shows the 
complexities and difficulties of enforcing the IHRL, while it does not change that climate 
change will have severe consequences for people who typically already are the most 
vulnerable. It can be said, that the nations with the fewest economic resources are usually 
those most vulnerable to consequences of climate change, but they are also least likely to be 
the bigger emitters (Humphreys, 2010: 5). But the bigger emitters with more resources and 
better economic wealth cannot be entirely responsible. This problematizes the idea that 
someone can be held accountable, because fault cannot in this context be traced back to one 
single person, government or nation. Bourban disagrees in this. He points the developed 
countries out as the most responsible for the violation of human rights, and therefore asks 
them to prevent violations of rights relating to climate change (Bourban, 2014: 42). The idea 
of preventing violations of human rights is the IHRL is even implemented in the first place, 
and climate change will violate basic human rights whether we like it or not. The question is 
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then whether preventing violations of human rights in relation to climate change issues can 
actually be done. If one were to hold a government accountable there is no easy solution to 
either fixing the damage that has already been done or preventing what is going to happen. 
Due to this, climate change stands as a threat to the IHRL and shows inadequacy of the law.  
Another issue of the IHRL becomes visible because it implies that everyone is equal, 
which should then imply that everyone has equal opportunities. However, people are 
affected by climate change differently and the consequences for each individual are 
experienced differently. Also, not everyone has the same access to needed resources as 
others do which highlights the unequal power relation, especially when it comes down to the 
possibility to act. This unequal relation should also be seen in the light of categories. The 
IHRL does not take categories of different power positions into account. These categories 
uphold people in a position, either limiting or empowering their opportunities for agency. 
We define ourselves and others through categories and through what we are not. Thus, the 
different categories ascribe meaning to each other positioning some with dominance and 
others inferiority. When human rights are violated and one is placed in a category of 
inferiority, the opportunity to act or change this is limited. Whilst others in categories of 
dominance are being ascribed more power to act or to choose not to, which then 
problematizes the idea that all are equal. The IHRL is then difficult to enforce, when 
positions of power have not been taken into account. We do not wish to go into a discussion 
of whether or not these categories are insufficient, since we take the view that they are. 
Nevertheless, they have influence on understanding the context of our research. Rather, we 
wish to shed light upon the problems of categorizing people into insufficient categories. 
These categorizations uphold and reproduce different power relations, which enforce that 
some are in a dominant position and others in an inferior one. These are not per se the only 
two outcomes or consequences of categorization, of which will be elaborated later in the 
study.  
These issues of operating with climate change as a human rights issue shows how the 
IHRL is difficult to enforce. Climate change stands as the threat that makes the 
insufficiencies visible and problematizes laws like these of international character. It should 
then be questioned whether it is about time that existing international laws and structures 
should be questioned and reevaluated. To this Singer argues, that when issues demand global 
solutions, then institutions should be strengthened in order to make global decisions, 
assigning the institutions more responsibility for the people affected (Singer, 2004: 199). If 
this does not happen, it will have severe social consequences especially for those who are the 
least to blame.  
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Adaptation Strategies 
As stated in the analysis migration is seen as the preferred and inevitable way for the low 
lying atoll-islands to adapt to the issues of climate change. As argued by Byravan and Rajan:  
 
“(...) people living in these vulnerable regions will be forced to flee, generally with no 
possibility of return to their original homes. Indeed, migration and permanent 
resettlement will be the only possible “adaptation” strategy available to millions.” 
(Byravan and Rajan, 2010: 253) 
 
This is also the view held by the Australian government who see migration as the only 
option since it will be less costly compared to decreasing greenhouse gas emissions (Barnett, 
2012: 172). Tong and Alofa request that the major polluters decrease their emissions because 
the survival of their nation is on the line. Nations such as Australia or New Zealand are 
diverting the attention away from their responsibility on the emissions of greenhouse gases 
by focusing on migration as the only option. This can be seen in the statements by Key, 
where he does not mention the possibility of decreasing emissions. Instead, he focuses on 
how they are likely to accommodate migration in the future.  Barnett is critical towards the 
assumption that migration is something to be handled by outsiders on behalf of islanders. He 
quotes Ross Garnaut, a leading economist and government adviser, when saying that:  
 
“(...) the South Pacific countries will end up having their populations relocated to 
Australia or New Zealand and the rest of the world expects that and in the end, we’re 
likely to accommodate that so there’s a solution there.” (Garnaut in Barnett, 2012: 172) 
 
Key also reproduces this discourse on relocation, since he articulates migration as something 
New Zealand will likely accommodate in the future, due to their compassionate view. This 
also implies how they want to decide how and when to accommodate this. By using the term 
relocation, it is also implied that a government moves a larger group of people from one 
place to another. This refers back to the colonial history of the pacific islands, where the 
British colonial government relocated island communities. Thus, both Garnaut and Key are 
reproducing a colonial power relation, where the developed countries are constructed as 
being in a dominant position, where they can choose whether or not to help the small 
developing islands to adapt to climate change and handle the relocation of them. This idea is 
contested by Tong, who is against forced mass migration and argues for other solutions in 
order to preserve the culture of Kiribati. This points to the importance of acknowledging the 
complexity of the process of migration and how it should not be handled by outsiders, but 
should take the needs and concerns of the pacific islanders into account. Migration may in 
time be the last option for the low-lying atoll islands, due to climate change and sea level 
rises.  But, as Barnett argues, a thorough adaptation strategy is needed when planning 
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migration on a larger scale, in order also to be considerate of people who wish to remain on 
the islands. This is important to be aware of, since large and uni-directional migration from 
small island nations will increase the vulnerability for those who stay behind.  
Since the Pacific Islands are in a vulnerable position, they are reliant on the help of 
others in order to adapt to climate change, and thus a global effort is needed. As argued by 
Birk, island communities can not only rely on their internal social and economic resources, 
but are also reliant on the ability to mobilize and benefit from the external resources 
available to them (Birk, 2012: 86). In the case of Kiribati, both Tong and Alofa have tried to 
reach out for help to adapt to the issues of climate change from nations such as Australia. 
Tong suggests the idea of floating islands as a solution, but no matter what, land is needed 
for the relocation or migration of people and thus the issues relating to migration still apply. 
As stated earlier, the general issue is that there is a lack of consideration for the concerns and 
the rights of migrants within the discourses on migration as the only option. We argue that it 
is important not to ignore the already gathered research on migration when planning 
migration as an adaptation strategy. As noted in the section on the contextual framework, 
migration or relocation is not something new to Kiribati, e.g. the Banabans who were 
relocated in 1945. McAdam argues how the Banabans is an example of how: 
 
“(...) states have created special statuses for relocated groups in the past, which may 
help to inform thinking about matters such as dual nationality, land rights, and the 
maintenance of distinct, self-governing communities, if groups are relocated across 
borders in the future.” (McAdam, 2016: 53) 
  
This is one of the interesting aspects of the Banaban case, because it is an example of people 
living under two jurisdictions. Even though the way in which the Banabans acquired their 
dual citizenship is based on an entangled and complex history, it can tell us something about 
the issues that can arise from this. An example of this is dual citizenship, which was not in 
function until 2009 when Fiji permitted dual citizenship. Thus, before 2009 the Banabans 
had to renounce their Fiji citizenship to take up citizenship in Kiribati: 
 
“Because approximately 90% of all Banabans resided on Rabi at the time of Kiribati’s 
independence—and most wanted to retain the citizenship of their country of residence, 
namely, Fiji—they were “effectively prevented from claiming their citizenship rights 
under the Constitution of Kiribati.”” (McAdam, 2016: 41) 
 
As shown from this quote, their dual citizenship was not functioning as intended and the 
Banabans were prevented from claiming this right. This should also be seen in light of the 
conflict between the Banaban community and Fiji, who were not enthusiastic about their 
newly acquired neighbors. This conflict is an effect of colonization, since relocating the 
Banaban community was an intervention by the British Colonial Government before Fiji 
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gained independence in 1970. What can then be drawn from this is the importance of being 
aware that when relocating large communities all involved parties, both the relocating and 
the host community, should agree on the rights of the relocated community, in this case the 
right to a dual citizenship. Again, this also underlines how a process like migration should 
not be handle by outsiders or only on the premises of the host-community, but must be done 
in collaboration and based on a legal framework. This also means that nations like Australia 
and New Zealand should not be in charge of relocating the communities in Kiribati, but 
should find a mutual agreement on how the migration process should proceed. 
As noted earlier, the IRHR is insufficient in relation to climate migration. This is further 
supported by McAdam, when she states how there has been a tendency to overlook 
important legal issues in the relocation of people: 
 
“(...) although land is obviously important, it offers no solution unless affected 
communities also have the right to enter and reside in the other country, enjoy their full 
range of human rights (including the right to work), and not be subject to expulsion.” 
(McAdam, 2016: 4)  
 
We argue how this is a very important aspect if migration as an adaptation strategy is to 
work. New land in itself will not be sufficient, since there is also a need of the securement of 
a certain set of rights in order for the relocation or migration to be meaningful. McAdam 
presents four aspects that are suggested as necessities when relocating communities:  
 
“1. Define the legal status of the relocated community within the new state  
2. Help communities adapt to local customs and laws 
3. Include consultation with potential host communities 
4. Contain measures to facilitate the diaspora community maintaining cultural ties, such 
as allowing dual citizenship.”  (McAdam, 2016: 4) 
 
Again, it can be noted how important it is to consult the host communities, which was not 
the case with the Banabans relocation to Fiji. Also, the need to define the legal status is 
mentioned as a necessity. These suggestions are a response to a number of concerns 
discussed in intergovernmental consultations with affected Pacific communities. The 
concerns on relocation are that it would:  
 
“(...) permanently rupture conceptions of home, land, and identity, and impact 
negatively on nationhood, sovereignty, control over land and sea resources, culture, and 
livelihoods.” (McAdam, 2016: 4).  
 
These concerns are also articulated by Tong and Alofa, both when it comes to the loss of 
identity, but also on the sovereignty of Kiribati, why migration is also still seen as a last 
resort. Birk also emphasizes the importance of consulting the local communities at an early 
stage giving the local communities a higher degree of agency in the decision-making process 
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on migration (Birk, 2012: 84). When the local communities have access to the decision-
making process they are empowered and have opportunities to affect the migration process 
in a way, which fits their needs. Concerning the historical aspect of migration, Birk states 
how: 
 
“Although comparative histories are often embedded in different socio-economic and 
political contexts, they can be used to demonstrate crucial aspects that may influence the 
outcome of future relocation policies. Using analogies of the past may therefore be 
useful as a diagnostic and predictive tool for future planning.” (Birk, 2012: 99) 
 
This quote illustrates well why it is relevant to look at the history of migration in the Pacific 
Islands as a way of predicting future outcomes in the planning process. If not for any 
concrete solutions, then at least in order to avoid repeating the mistakes of exploitation in the 
colonial past of the Pacific Islands. As argued, it is crucial to acknowledge the wishes and 
needs of the communities facing migration. This is also the case with the host communities, 
who must be ready to participate in a dialogue with the migration communities in order to 
obtain mutual agreements on legal rights. Climate migration may be inevitable for many of 
the small Pacific Islands. Perhaps with help from previous knowledge and the development 
of thorough resettlement strategies, migration can, when needed, work as an adaptive 
strategy to climate change.  
The power of and the fallacies within structures and categories 
Regarding the categorization of Teitiota, we conclude that Key is in a dominant position and 
that he attempts to gain discursive legitimacy due to the legal rejection of Teitiota. As argued 
in the analysis, the existing categories and terminologies regarding a person who is displaced 
are insufficient, since a category such as overstayer does not account for the impacts it will 
have for the person displaced. Such a category is a social construction which functions to 
control people who cross borders. Therefore, the way that humans construct categories as a 
way of making meaning and universal structures in a globalizing world is insufficient when 
concerned with social and cultural consequences for human beings, which a category cannot 
grasp. This relates to the distribution of power, which is often claimed and exercised by the 
developed nations, meaning that the nations who often suffer the most in relation to 
distribution of resources and the impacts of climate change is the global south. Shiva argues 
on the notion of corporate globalization in a historical frame, that industrialization was 
brought from the global north to the global south disguised as development. The unequal 
distribution of power stems from a long heritage and tradition of ruling through exploitation: 
“Corporate rule through globalization continues to build upon the foundation that 
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colonialism created and continues to leave behind it a trail of devastation and destruction.” 
(Shiva, 2005: 29) This goes along with the outline of discursive legitimacy. Morrissey 
contemplates how there is often a battle of ascribing meaning to a term, which indicates 
different positions of power. Going back to a partial conclusion from the analysis, Key is 
pursuing to gain discursive legitimacy through his already powerful position as the prime 
minister of New Zealand. Due to his political position, he has access to participate in the 
battle of discursive legitimacy, whereas Teitiota’s arguments are contested as illegitimate, 
which thus makes it difficult for him to enter the battle of discursive legitimacy. Both within 
the reproduction of an already existing discourse and when new discourses are constructed, 
the possibility for changing these is present. The question is then if Teitiota would be unable 
to change or object to this discourse, as he is not a subject who is ideologically interpellated 
with no possibility for action of change: 
  
“Fairclough also adheres to the consensus within critical cultural studies in rejecting 
parts of Althusser’s theory on the grounds that Althusser regards people as passive 
ideological subjects and thus underestimates their possibilities for action.” (Phillips & 
Jørgensen, 2002: 75) 
 
Phillips and Jørgensen argue how Fairclough ascribes to the sentiment that it is important to 
reflect upon that there is a possibility for change. This is particularly interesting when living 
in a world where structures and categories are dictated by the rich and developed nations. 
The power of structures in Key’s discourse of overstayer displays the use of power through a 
political discourse, which is upheld by a legal system of categories created to control the 
influx of people crossing borders. Even though Teitiota is not interpellated as such and 
possesses the possibility to resist, his position is still inferior to the legal structures and the 
category he is positioned and judged within. Teitiota was the first from Kiribati to seek 
asylum due to climate change, but what will happen when the I-Kiribatian people will have 
to migrate, no matter if it is willingly or forced? The discourse regarding Teitiota’s case and 
the actual outcome might leave the I-Kiribatians with an uncertain future. There are no legal 
frameworks acknowledging the I-Kiribatian case of emergency. Rather, they have Key’s 
word of New Zealand being compassionate if it comes to the case of large scale migration. 
This brings forward the profound impact words and promises from nation-state leaders have 
on their citizens, even if they remain empty promises. In general, language and words might 
be all we can relate to but if a sufficient legal framework were to exist, this would surely 
comprehend some of the trust issues and social consequences that these empty promises 
hold. 
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Another discourse, which is important to discuss, is the discourse on the international 
community and industries. It brings to mind, that the questions of who should own up to 
their responsibility towards Kiribati are problematic and unanswered. Since it is not our task 
to answer these questions, we display the notion of responsibility that is created through the 
discourse of Tong. The discourse of industries articulated by Tong invites the possibility for 
change, as does the discourse of the failed international community, thus it points to the 
collective responsibility - Kiribati included. Although when tested towards corporate 
interests, greenhouse gas emissions of the developed nations primarily affect the livelihoods 
of the developing nations thus they uphold the companies and the national interests, which 
do not add up to sustainability of the nature. This also entails the lack of acting on the 
responsibility towards developing nations, which arguably is the case for Kiribati: 
 
“Frequently, growth is generated by converting resources from nature’s economy into 
market commodities. Economic growth takes place through the exploitation of natural 
resources. Deforestation creates growth. Mining of groundwater creates growth. 
Overfishing creates growth (...) Nature shrinks as capital grows.” (Shiva, 2005: 32) 
  
This points to the urgency of the industries and the nation-states to rearrange their decision-
making according to the critical forecast of the environment and Kiribati, instead of 
according to their national economic interests. We acknowledge that structures do exist and 
that certain discourses constitute and reproduce unequal power relations. Hence, we have 
pointed out the insufficiency of categories and the discourses, which might seem to be 
unchangeable. Moreover we point to the urgency of the rational arguments for preserving the 
continuance of Kiribati through collective action by industries and nation-states. This is not 
only problematic due to the unequal distribution of power, but also because the international 
community is a myth - merely made up of an entity of nation-states protecting their national 
interests. This will be the next point of departure for discussion. 
The exit of borders 
Burkett challenges the established order of sovereignty and nation-states. Nation Ex-Situ 
accounts for the need of an international legal framework ensuring the future of nations 
endangered by climate change. In short, the notion can also be accounted for as a 
deterritorialized state (Burkett, 2013: 91).  
Optimally, the international actors that were to reduce their emissions would have 
owned up to this commitment. Additionally, profound political will and collective 
responsibility towards the Pacific Islands, such as Kiribati, is necessary for them to continue 
to exist regardless of sea level rises. The deadline for cutting down emissions has passed a 
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long time ago, and the sea levels will rise despite any attempts to undo it. Therefore, Burkett 
argues that for Pacific Islands to survive a framework such as Nation Ex-Situ has to be 
accounted for (Burkett, 2013: 89). This framework and the issues concerning this will be 
discussed in the following.  
The Westphalian system of nation-states and borders was constructed in 1648 as a 
means of ensuring security and stability. This system is maintained to this day and is part of 
preserving the way that the world is structured through borders. Thus the Westphalia fails at 
capturing the experience of being a person of a deterritorialized nation (Burkett, 2013: 99). 
Nation Ex-Situ partly challenges this conception of the world, as Burkett argues:  
 
“Allowing the deterritorialized State – bound by culture and experience – to maintain a 
place in the international community would meet the objective purpose of the 
Westphalian system at a time when climate change poses an extraordinary threat to 
territorial integrity, as well as to global peace and Security.” (Burkett, 2013: 106). 
 
This means, that if the Westphalian system holds to create security and stability, then Ex-
Situ nationhood would be possible to apply as a legal framework in Kiribati, without 
compromising the fundamental idea of the system. Though, the problem within this 
framework is that since there was no will at the international level to commit to reduce gas 
emissions, one could anticipate that the similar will to commit to a framework such as 
Nation Ex-Situ would remain absent. In line with Burkett, we argue that climate change calls 
into question the structures of nation-states. When following her arguments of abandoning 
the requirement of territory as a determining factor for making a state, within the legal 
framework of statehood, the claim that the traditional nation-state arrangement is confirmed 
not fit for crisis (Burkett, 2013: 102). In relation to this, Burkett argues that there have been 
nation-states deviating from the traditional way of defining statehood before: 
 
“Governments in exile are examples of functional, yet non-territorial entities that 
international law also recognizes. (...) indigenous nations, such as the Maori or Tibetans, 
are examples of these communities that have been internally dislocated or formally 
deterritorialized by the processes of invasion or colonization.” (Burkett, 2013: 98). 
 
This means, that Nation Ex-Situ is as such already functional, only not in an institutionalized 
sense. Therefore, we could hope that nation-states would not be too reluctant to implement it 
as a legal framework since it is urgent in the sense of preserving the nationhood of island 
states such as Kiribati.  
A notion that could challenge the structure of borders and nation-states, and the 
imagined sense of nationhood, is cosmopolitanism. This entails how the belief of all human 
beings as belonging to a single global community should be acknowledged, no matter their 
statehood or political boundaries (Burkett, 2013: 99). Such a notion could provide for an 
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alternative way of trying to comprehend the rising numbers of people crossing borders in a 
meaningful way through a global citizenship equal to that of cosmopolitanism. It will 
continue to be problematic to create a collective community when nation-state leaders 
continue to put national interests before global interests, which after all is what the voters 
expect when electing a national leadership (Singer, 2004: 4). Therefore, Nation Ex-Situ 
combined with cosmopolitanism invites to the elimination of borders. By creating a global 
community in which everyone belongs, the interests will shift from a national perspective to 
a more common good. This also leaves room for people crossing borders without having to 
suffer under insufficient legal frameworks and categories. This is in no sense easy or 
unproblematic and, as Singer also argues, it is vital to engage in how to prevent global 
institutions and frameworks to become oppressive or pretentious bureaucracies. Rather, there 
is still an urgent need to figure out how to make an effective and responsive global decision-
making body for the people whose lives it actually impacts (Singer, 2004: 199).  
Since nuances and complexities regarding issues of climate migration are presented as 
fluid, the matching solutions must be fluid as well, thus a border should not be static. This 
does not only frame a demand for a global community, rather a rearrangement of the 
decisive powers within it.  
Contemporary crisis and climate migration 
In the following we want to contextualize the need for a legal framework. Therefore a 
contemporary example is presented: the massive influx of people crossing borders due to 
political instability and civil wars, mainly in and from Syria. This frames the importance of 
creating rational legal frameworks, which can bear and comprehend these issues. It has 
become evident in the light of the situation in Europe that already existing frameworks are 
insufficient, mainly due to lack of political will in Europe. The people crossing borders have 
shaken up the policy of European nation states regarding migration and asylum, causing 
many governments to strengthen border-control and raising fences in the attempt to keep the 
influx down (Yazgan et al., 2015: 181). The wording of massive is regarding the influx of 
people crossing the borders of neighboring countries such as Lebanon and Jordan. This 
means that Europe is not close to experiencing this massive influx, but yet the political 
discourse regarding this creates the notion of a crisis. The crisis is: the situation in Syria and 
for the Syrian people, the insufficiency of legal frameworks and the political will towards 
people fleeing, rather than a description of what Europe is experiencing as of right now. One 
could argue, that it is a crisis of European identity, rather than a refugee crisis. The influx of 
people fleeing will become even more massive over time, and the reasons to cross borders 
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are only multiplying with the arrival of climate migration. The situation in Europe has not 
gone unnoticed by Tong. It is thus a sincere concern for him what will happen to his people: 
“In the event that nothing comes forward from the international community, we are 
preparing, we don’t want to be caught like what’s happening in Europe. OK?” (Appendix 3: 
3)  His point about what is to come is profound and the notion of the failed responsibility of 
the international community to comprehend the influx of people fleeing because of war is 
stated. The question is then what will happen when the international community needs to 
comprehend the influx of I-Kiribatians caused by climate change, which is still not 
recognized by all nation-state leaders as a valid reason for migrating. 
Climate migrants have been internally displaced within the Pacific region thus far. The 
very pronouncement of Kiribati’s disappearance and the rejection of Teitiota as the first 
miniature example of what is to come, brings to mind that new notions of responsibility must 
be created followed by a new way to understand how people move across and within nation-
states and borders. As suggested by Michelle McKinley: “(...) contemporary global 
movement forces a rethinking beyond the State that is traditionally marked by borders.” 
(McKinley in Burkett, 2013: 99) This is in line with what we have argued earlier. Our 
discussion ends at a bleak, but yet suggestive statement, which indeed challenges a more 
traditional nation-state system and underlines the dreaded forecast of Kiribati as real, 
contemporary and afar the notion of nation-state borders. 
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Conclusion 
By examining the discourses of climate migration we end with the following findings.  
Tong constructs climate change as a present, global issue and due to his position as a 
politician he requests that international partners should collaborate. Migration is articulated 
as an unavoidable solution, though it should be a last resort. We conclude that climate 
change is a human rights issue but climate change also poses a threat to the IHRL making it 
clear where the law becomes insufficient. The IHRL does not take positions of power into 
account, hence making it difficult to enforce. Holding someone accountable for violating 
human rights due to climate change is not possible. Therefore, we conclude that when 
reviewing the existing failures of the IHRL and legal frameworks for a person displaced, 
international laws must be questioned and reevaluated.  
Alofa constructs the I-Kiribatians as a Christian people with strong cultural roots. The 
Christian community plays an important part in informing about climate change and in the 
decision-making process on adaptation. Migration is not a new phenomenon to the Pacific 
Islanders, but their strong bond to their homeland makes it crucial to handle migration in a 
way that acknowledges their needs and concerns. Furthermore, precautious measures must 
be taken in order to avoid a loss of identity. The concerns of the I-Kiribatians relates to their 
colonial history. Therefore, if migration is to be a solution it should be planned carefully 
through an ongoing dialogue between the migrating communities and the receiving nations 
and with mutual agreements on the legal statuses of the migrating communities. 
Furthermore, we conclude that the idea of relocation has colonial connotations, which limits 
the opportunity for action and agency. Meanwhile, migration is based on an active choice, 
which is essential for a meaningful adaptation.  
Key does not validate climate change as a contemporary issue, but as an issue to come 
in the future. Thus, he does not acknowledge that the I-Kiribatians possess valid grounds to 
migrate or flee in present time. Key’s limitation of power is visible in his use of euphemism 
and in his attempt to gain discursive legitimacy. The construction of Teitiota as illegitimate 
is alarming in the sense that he is a contemporary proof of what is to come for future I-
Kiribatians who cross borders. This displays the insufficiency of terminologies and 
categories and the power relations within. 
We conclude that because climate change is such a fluid concept, the conceptions of 
climate migration are just as varying - if climate change is not acknowledged to be a 
contemporary issue, then neither is migration caused by climate change. The people who are 
facing climate migration have no place to go if the nations with resources, or the 
geographical location, to receive them are unwilling to do so. We view this as an aspect of a 
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political agenda, which legitimizes the reasons for not acting upon climate change. Thus, it 
is concluded that these actors are all conscious of the vocabulary they are using. 
When discussing the future prospects of I-Kiribatians, Nation Ex-Situ points to a way of 
encountering the future challenges of a loss of territory in a world constructed by and 
legitimized through borders. Therefore we also point to the rather alarming idea of 
eliminating borders for a more cosmopolitan world structure in order to create a meaningful 
and functional global community. This is not easily done, rather it is a normative approach 
towards issues concerning legal frameworks, law and policy-making, restructuring of 
political bodies and furthermore a disruptor of the socially constructed borders. Nonetheless, 
these are our contributions when trying to encounter the rising tides of climate migration. 
 
  
 64 
Bibliography 
Barnett, Jon (2012) On the risks of engineering mobility to reduce vulnerability to climate 
change: Insides from a small Island State in Kirsten Hastrup & Karen Olwig: Climate 
Change and Human Mobility pp. 169-189. Cambridge University Press, New York. 
 
Birk, Thomas (2012) Relocation of reef and atoll island communities as an adaptation to 
climate change: learning from experience in Solomon Islands in Kirsten Hastrup & Karen 
Olwig: Climate Change and Human Mobility pp.81-109. Cambridge University Press, New 
York. 
 
Bourban, Michel (2014) Climate Change, Human Rights and the Problem of Motivation in 
De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 1:1. Linköping 
University Electronic Press, Linköping  
 
Byravan, Sujatha and Rajan, Sudhir Chella (2010) The Ethical Implications of Sea-Level 
Rise Due to Climate Change in Ethics and International Affairs  
 
Burkett, Maxine (2013) Nation Ex-Situ in Gerrard, Michael B. and Wannier, Gregory E.: In 
Threatened Island Nations pp. 89-123. Cambridge University Press, New York.  
 
Burkett, Maxine (2011) In Search of Refuge: Pacific Islands, Climate-Induced Migration, 
and the Legal Frontier in Asia Pacific Issues no. 98. East West Center  
 
Caney, Simon (2012)  in Humphreys, Stephen: Climate Change and Human mobility pp. 
69-90. Cambridge University Press, New York. 
 
Hastrup, Kirsten and Olwig, Karen (2012) Climate Change and Human mobility. 
Cambridge University Press, New York. 
 
Humphreys, Stephen (2010) Human Rights and Climate Change. Cambridge University 
Press, New York. 
 
Kempf, David  (2012) Climate change, migration, and Christianity in Oceania in Kirsten 
Hastrup & Karen Olwig: Climate Change and Human mobility pp. 235-257. Cambridge 
University Press, New York.  
 
Laczko, Frank and Piguet, Etienne (2014) People on the Move in a Changing Climate: 
The Regional Impact of Environmental Change on Migration. Springer, Dordrecht. 
 
Morrissey, James: Contextualizing links between migration and environmental change in 
northern Ethiopia (2012) in Kirsten Hastrup & Karen Olwig: Climate Change and Human 
mobility pp.110-146. Cambridge University Press, New York.  
 
Millar, Ilona and Gascoigne,  Catherine and Caldwell, Elizabeth (2013) Making Good 
the Loss: An Assessment of the Loss and Damage Mechanism under the UNFCCC Process 
in Gerrard, Michael B. and Wannier, Gregory E.: In Threatened Island Nations pp. 433-479. 
Cambridge University Press, New York. 
•        
         
Phillips, Louise and Jørgensen, Marianne W. (2010) Discourse analysis - as Theory and 
Method. Sage Publications LTD, London.  
 
 65 
Shiva, Vandana (2005) Earth Democracy: Justice Sustainability and Peace. 2. edition, Zed 
Books, London. 
 
Singer, Peter (2004) One World - the ethics of Globalization. Second edtition, Yale 
University Press,  
 
Solomon, Michele Klein & Warner, Koko (2013) Protection of Persons Displaced as a 
Result of Climate Change: Existing tools and emerging framework in Gerrard, Michael B. 
and Wannier, Gregory E.: In Threatened Island Nations pp. 243-299. Cambridge University 
Press, New York. 
 
Stoutenburg, Jenny Grote (2013) When do States Disappear?: Thresholds of effective 
statehood and the continued recognition of “Deterritorialized” Island States in Gerrard, 
Michael B. and Wannier, Gregory E.: In Threatened Island Nations pp. 57-89. Cambridge 
University Press, New York. 
 
Stevenson, Hayley and Dryzek, John S (2012) The discursive democratisation of global 
climate governance in Environmental Politics Vol. 21, No. 2 pp. 189–210 
 
Sørensen, Mikkel & Eskjær, Mikkel Fugl (2014) Klima og mennesker - Humanistiske 
perspektiver på klimaforandringer, Museum Tusculanums Forlag. Med støtte fra Det 
Humanistiske Fakultet, Københavns Universitet.    
       
Werksman, Jacob David (2013) Could a Small Island successfully sue a Big Emitter? 
Pursuing a legal theory and a venue for climate justice. in Gerrard, Michael B. and Wannier, 
Gregory E.: In Threatened Island Nations. pp. 409-433. Cambridge University Press, New 
York. 
 
Yazgan, Pinar Utku, Deniz Eroglu and Sirkeci, Ibrahim (2015). Syrian Crisis and 
Migration. In: Migration Letters, Volume: 12, No: 3, pp. 181 – 192  
Web Resources 
ABC Local (n.d.). Sunday Nights. Accessed: 05/08/2016, from: 
http://www.abc.net.au/sundaynights/  
 
ABC (03/22/2015). The Interview: Pelenise Elofa on Kiribati and Climate Change. 
Accessed: 05/10/2016, from:  
http://www.abc.net.au/sundaynights/stories/s4202534.htm  
 
BBC Asia (n.d). The man who would be the first climate change refugee. Accessed: 
04/01/2016, from:  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34674374  
 
Bio. (n.d.). Peter Singer Biography. Accessed: 05/10/2016, 
from:  
http://www.biography.com/people/peter-singer-39994) 
 
Brill (n.d.). Disappearing Island States in International Law. Accessed: 05/10/2016, 
from:   
http://www.brill.com/products/book/disappearing-island-states-international-law 
 
Global Forum on Migration & Development (n.d.). Michelle Klein Solomon. Accessed: 
05/10/2016, 
 66 
from:  https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/microsites/IDM/workshops
/ensuring_protection_070909/bio_kleinsolomon.htm  
 
Goodreads (5/9/2015). One World: The Ethics of Globalization. Accessed: 05/10/2016, 
from: 
http://www.goodreads.com/review/show/1332995154?book_show_action=true&from_revie
w_page=1. 
 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (n.d.). Jacob Werksman. 
accessed: 05/10/2016, from:  
http://www.ictsd.org/about-us/jacob-werksman 
 
Kiribati Climate Change (n.d.). Relocate. Accessed: 05/08/2016, from: 
http://www.climate.gov.ki/category/action/relocation/  
 
LSE Law (n.d.). Stephen Humphreys. Accessed: 05/13/2016, from:  
https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff/stephen-humphreys.htm 
NBR (n.d.). Key announces incentives for immigrants to settle outside Auckland. Accessed: 
04/10/2016, from: http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/key-announces-incentives-immigrants-settle-
outside-auckland-ck-176138  
 
Nasa Global Climate Change (n.d.). Scientific Consensus: Earth’s climate is warming. 
Accessed: 05/09/2016, from:  
http://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ 
 
National Working for New Zealand (n.d.). Less Dept, More Jobs, Strong Stable Government. 
Accessed: 04/25/2016, from:  
https://www.national.org.nz/about/about-national 
 
Revolvy. (n.d.). Sujatha Byravan. Accessed: 05/12/2016, from:  
http://broom02.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=Sujatha%20Byravan  
 
Simon Caney (n.d.). About Me. Accessed 13/05/2016, from:  
http://simoncaney.weebly.com/about-me.html 
 
Stuff (n.d.). Kiribati Ioane Teitoa loses bid to stay in New Zealand. Accessed: 04/25/2016, 
from: http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/72291170/Kiribati-man-Ioane-Teitoa-loses-bid-to-
stay-in-New-Zealand  
 
TED (n.d.). Anote Tong. Accessed: 05/08/2016, from: 
https://www.ted.com/speakers/anote_tong  
 
Tellus Institute for a Great Transition (n.d.). Sudhir Chella Rajan. Accessed: 05/17/16, from: 
http://64.78.58.199/about/Rajan.html  
 
United Nations University, Migration Network (n.d.). Dr. Koko Warner. Accessed: 
05/10/2016, from:  
http://migration.unu.edu/about/researchers/warner#overview  
 
UNHCR (06.18.2005) Worldwide displacement hits all-time high as war and persecution 
increase Accessed: 05.17.2016 from: 
http://www.unhcr.org/558193896.html  
 
 67 
Unil - Université de Lausanne (n.d.). Michel Bourban. Accessed: 05/12/2016, from:  
https://www.unil.ch/philo/fr/home/menuinst/moderne-et-
contemporaine/collaborateurs/michel-bourban.html  
 
Vandana Shiva (n.d.). About Dr. Vandana Shiva. Accessed: 05/10/2016, 
from:  
http://vandanashiva.com/?page_id=2 
 
William S. Richardson School of Law (n.d.). Maxine Burkett. Accessed: 05/10/2016, 
from:  
https://www.law.hawaii.edu/personnel/burkett/maxine  
 
 
